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ABSTRACT
While both self-report (SR) and conditional reasoning (CR) measures of
achievement motivation (AM) and fear-of-failure (FF) have been shown to be
predictive of academic and organizational outcomes (James, 1998; Spangler, 1992),
substantial criterion variance is often left unaccounted for by either measurement
system when used in isolation. The current work proposes a new, theoretical model of
AM and FF created by integrating information on explicit cognitions gathered from SR
with information on implicit cognitions gathered from CR. This “integrative model” of
assessment provides an enhanced understanding of the approach-avoidance conflicts
people experience when they are faced with challenging tasks. Predictions derived
from the model are supported in two student samples and one managerial sample.
Specifically, the explicit and implicit AM/FF cognitions combine additively or
multiplicatively in the prediction of effort and performance. It is concluded that in
order to advance our understanding and prediction of behavior, psychologists should
integrate explicit personality components with implicit components in theoretical and
practical pursuits.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Allport (1937) and many later psychologists (e.g., Goldberg, 1990; Hogan,
Hogan, & Roberts, 1996; John, 1990) have described and investigated personality in
terms of stable, explicit traits. Alternatively, Murray (1938) and his intellectual
descendants (e.g., McClelland, 1951; Winter, 1996) have conceptualized and explored
personality in terms of dynamic, implicit motives. These different conceptualizations
of personality have also been accompanied by two different techniques of personality
measurement. Traditionally, trait theorists have preferred the use of direct, self-reports
elicited in response to standardized questionnaires whereas those interested in implicit
motives have preferred the use of indirect, projective descriptions elicited in response
to ambiguous stimuli (Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998).
Occasionally, these two separate streams of personality theory and
measurement have crossed to form integrative and multiplicative investigations of
personality (McClelland, 1985; McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989; Winter et
al., 1998). The current work is one of these crossings, and although self-report is
utilized in this integrative model as it has been in the past to provide the explicit,
conscious component of personality for the integration, a new technique is used to
provide the implicit, unconscious component. The new technique is founded in
“conditional reasoning,” which serves to provide an indirect measurement system for
the assessment of implicit social cognitions (James, McIntyre, Glisson, Green, Patton,
LeBreton, Mitchell, & Williams, under review). Prior to describing this new
1

measurement system and the integrative model of personality central to the current
work, former integrative investigations of personality relevant to the current
investigation are reviewed below.
Past Integrative Investigations of Personality
In 1985 McClelland reviewed investigations of achievement and affiliation
outcomes relevant to Atkinson’s (1964) multiplicative theory of the tendency to
achieve success. Atkinson (1964) used the following formula to predict an achieving
tendency:
Ts

=

Ms

´

Ps

´

INs.

In the above formula, the tendency to achieve success (Ts) is seen as a multiplicative
function of the motive to achieve success (Ms), the expectancy of success (Ps), and the
incentive value of success (INs). In the studies reviewed by McClelland (1985), Ms
was either experimentally manipulated as a situational variable via instructional sets,
or assessed in terms of individual differences via the Thematic Apperception Test
(TAT). Expectancy of success was either experimentally manipulated as a situational
variable via increased practice, or assessed in terms of individual differences via the
self-report of skill level. Incentive value of success was measured via self-report
attitude questionnaires. The various investigations reviewed demonstrated that as the
motive to achieve increased, a corresponding increase in achievement performance
would be observed as long as achievement was valued. Alternatively, when
achievement was not valued, then little to no change in achievement performance
would be observed across increases in the motive to achieve. Figure 1 (all
2

figures/tables are located in the appendix) provides a basic illustration of this 2-way
interaction (see Figure 2, p. 816 in McClelland, 1985).
The results for the prediction of affiliation outcomes took this basic form as
well (see Figures 3 & 4, pp. 818 & 822, respectively, in McClelland, 1985). Indeed,
with respect to the affiliation outcomes McClelland (1985, pp. 822-823) drew the
following conclusions:
[A] person’s belief that he or she is likely to be
successful in social interaction does not lead to more
[social] interaction unless that individual is motivated to
use the skill…Affiliative choices may also be conceived
of as responses to specific eliciting stimuli, that is, to
contrived stimulus situations represented by
questionnaire items. Conscious self-referent responses
of this type are determined almost entirely by values
deriving from the same cognitive source as the
choices…[C]ognitive schemas…organize…feelings,
attitudes, and choices in a particular area such as
affiliation or achievement. When people are asked
whether they would like doing something “with friends,”
the question taps a value associated with liking for
people that determines how they answer the question.1
Clearly, in his review of integrative investigations of personality, McClelland (1985)
concluded that the self-report methodology tapped cognitive schemas of the self to
which the self had conscious access. McClelland (1985) used the term “values” to
label these explicit, conscious components of personality in accordance with
Atkinson’s (1964) multiplicative model. However, with respect to the “motives” of the
multiplicative model, in which McClelland (1985, p. 823) historically had been more
interested, he drew different conclusions: “[T]he frequency with which people

1

Italics are added for emphasis and are not found in the original text.
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converse with someone else is determined primarily by the pleasure they more or less
unconsciously receive from such interactions, as reflected in the strength of the
affiliative motive measured in imaginative thought.”2 As the TAT was used
exclusively to code imaginative thought in the studies reviewed, with this conclusion
McClelland (1985) ascribed to the TAT the power to measure the implicit,
unconscious components of personality.
In 1989 McClelland et al. abandoned the term “value” in the description of
attitudinal or self-reported motives in favor of “self-attributed motives” (p. 690). They
also argued that both self-attributed motives (i.e., stable emotive/behavioral patterns or
conscious traits) and implicit motives (i.e., dynamic changes in unconscious goals)
were required to accurately describe personality. Once again, McClelland et al. (1989)
reiterated the conceptualization of personality at the level of self-attributed and thus
conscious motives when measured via self-report, and as implicit and thus
unconscious motives when derived from stories given in response to the pictures of the
TAT. Also in this work McClelland et al. (1989) formalized the major premise of the
integrative model of personality as follows: “Self-attributed motives, more often than
implicit motives, are allied to explicit goals that are normative for a particular group
and that channel the expression of implicit motives for members of that group (pp.
692-693).” Here was the origin of the channeling hypothesis that would be more
formally articulated and tested by Winter and his colleagues.

2
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Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, and Duncan (1998, p. 231) proposed the
“fundamental hypothesis that motives involve wishes, desires, or goals (often implicit
or nonconscious), whereas traits channel or direct the ways in which motives are
expressed in particular actions throughout the life course.” Winter et al. (1998)
integrated the trait of extraversion-introversion with the affiliative motive to provide a
theoretical model of this proposition from which testable hypotheses could be derived.
Table 1 presents the prototypical and hypothesized outcomes of the theoretical model
generated by Winter et al. (1998, p. 238) when integrating low and high affiliative
motives with introverted and extraverted behavioral tendencies (i.e., traits).
The model illustrates that both an introvert and an extravert may desire
affectionate, close interpersonal relationships (i.e., have a high affiliative motive), but
the reserved tendencies of the former may hinder the development of these
relationships whereas the gregarious tendencies of the latter may facilitate their
formation. Alternatively, both an introvert and an extravert may lack the desire for
affectionate, close interpersonal relationships, and the reserved tendencies of the
former may lead to hours of comfortable solitude whereas the gregarious tendencies of
the latter may lead to generating a well-liked reputation for ulterior motives (e.g., the
desire for power and influence). Clearly, the integration of the trait and motive
concepts allows for a much more complex and richer picture of personality than any
previous attempts to explain personality with one concept at the expense or exclusion
of the other.

5

The empirical evidence presented by Winter et al. (1998) strongly supported
their theoretical integrative model reproduced in Table 1. Figure 2 illustrates one of
the interactions between extraversion-introversion and the affiliative motive found by
Winter et al. (1998, p 245) in the prediction of interpersonal outcomes. Notice that
introverts desiring close interpersonal relations as indicated by a high affiliative
motive are much more likely than others to experience relationship difficulties (i.e.,
increased divorces and remarriages), which is precisely what is predicted from the
theoretical model. Specifically, it appears that introverts desiring close relations lack
the behavioral repertoire (i.e., trait) needed to “channel” their desire in a direction that
prevents relationship difficulties in comparison to their extraverted counterparts.
Alternatively, when introverts have a low affiliative motive, they are as adaptive as
their extraverted counterparts in terms of generating positive relationship outcomes
and avoiding negative ones (see Figure 2). Consequently, it would appear that when a
motive is supported by a trait that facilitates the motive’s expression with ease,
positive outcomes follow. Otherwise, if there is a lack of congruence between the
motive and the trait, then positive outcomes are impeded. Various other interactions
were found by Winter et al. (1998) in support of this channeling hypothesis.
At the end of his review, in which the multiplicative integration of traits and
motives was shown to explain as much as 75% of the variation in affiliative behavior,
McClelland (1985, p. 824) called for “more studies of this sort.” It is surprising that
this call has been answered so rarely, and then primarily by one of McClelland’s own
direct intellectual descendants, David Winter (see Winter, et al., 1998). Obviously, the
6

pursuit of an integrative model of personality can be difficult as it requires
independent measures of conscious and unconscious components of personality, and
the TAT has been the instrument of choice for the assessment of the unconscious
components. Consequently, one can certainly speculate that both the administrative
and psychometric difficulties encountered when using the TAT (Aiken, 1994;
Anastasi, 1982; Dana, 1982; James, 1998; James & Mazerolle, 2002; Koestner &
McClelland, 1990) have contributed to a practical reluctance on the part of
psychologists to pursue integrative models of personality. Specifically, the TAT must
be administered and scored by a highly trained professional in a serial and one-on-one
fashion to study participants. Consequently, it is time consuming and costly to use for
research purposes. Additionally, the TAT relies on the unstructured, free-response of
participants’ descriptions of the fantasies they generate in response to evocative
pictures. Not only may participants generate different fantasies on different occasions,
but also the scoring of a particular response may be a function of the scorer and/or
whether the response is in oral or written form (cf. Dana, 1982; James, 1998).
Consequently, the TAT can be psychometrically unreliable and can lack criterionrelated validity (Dana, 1982; Entwisle, 1972; James, 1998; Koestner & McClelland,
1990; McClelland, 1985, p. 820), although this certainly is not always the case (e.g.,
see McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982; Spangler, 1992; Winter, et al., 1998).
Given the aforementioned difficulties with the TAT, the current work attempts
to pursue an integrative model of personality, specifically one for achievement
motivation (AM) and fear-of-failure (FF), that utilizes a new measure of the implicit
7

AM and FF cognitive components within personality. This new measure is founded in
“conditional reasoning,” which is described below.
Conditional Reasoning
The conditional reasoning technique was designed to circumvent the egoenhancing biases that detract from the accuracy of self-reports of personality by
making the self-justificatory components of these biases the subject of measurement.
This is possible because people with different dispositional tendencies tend to use
different unconscious biases in their reasoning when attempting to justify their actions.
These biases are unconscious to the extent that people are typically not aware of their
own tendency to grant rationality to reasoning that sustains the expression of their own
motives while discounting reasoning that supports the expression of motives
incompatible with their own (James et al., under review). Reasoning is said to be
"conditional" when the likelihood that a person will consider a behavior to be
reasonable depends upon the strength of that person's inclination to engage in the
behavior (James, 1998).
People typically want to believe the best about themselves, and therefore they
often reason conditionally because they want to believe that their behavior is
reasonable and justified, as opposed to irrational and unwarranted. Thus, within the
context of AM and FF, people unconsciously or implicitly reason in ways that justify
either approaching or avoiding achievement-oriented tasks (James, 1998).
Consequently, when attempting to justify an achievement-oriented behavior people
may rely on certain implicit cognitions that bias their reasoning in a way that enhances
8

the behavior's rational appeal. One such bias in reasoning that is used by achievementoriented persons to justify achievement-oriented behavior is the positive connotation
of achievement striving bias. The positive connotation of achievement striving bias is
the tendency to associate effort (i.e., intensity, persistence) on demanding tasks with
admirable qualities and outcomes such as “dedication,” “concentration,”
“commitment,” and “success.” The juxtaposed bias in reasoning used by fear-offailure persons to justify the avoidance of achievement-oriented behavior is the
negative connotation of achievement striving bias. The negative connotation of
achievement striving bias is the tendency to associate effort (i.e., intensity, persistence)
on demanding tasks with negative qualities and outcomes such as “overloaded,”
“stressed,” “obsessed,” and “burnout.” For example, a college student high in AM
may very well utilize positive connotations of achievement striving and frame the
activity of studying for hours and hours on the weekends, in place of pursuing the
campus social life, as “rewarding” and as evidence of “commitment” to higher
learning. Alternatively, a college student high in FF may very well utilize negative
connotations of achievement striving and frame the exact same behavior as
“compulsive” and “obsessive.” Furthermore, by not studying as much as the AM
counterpart, the student high in FF has an a priori excuse for not doing as well on the
same test, which serves to protect the ego and self-image when and if failure is
encountered. Certainly, the reader can recall the occasional student’s excuse for poor
test performance that resembles the following: “I would have ‘aced’ that test if I had
studied as much as everyone else.”
9

Thus, there are implicit cognitions that serve as the foundations of various
justification mechanisms (JMs) that people high in FF use to maintain a positive selfimage even when experiencing failure, as in the above example. Conversely, there are
alternative implicit cognitions that serve to provide the foundations of the various
justification mechanisms (JMs) used by those high in AM to maintain a positive selfimage when devoting long hours to accomplishing demanding tasks in place of
pursuing other activities. The positive connotation of achievement striving is just one
of five primary justification mechanisms used in the reasoning of those high in AM to
enhance the logical appeal and justifiability of their achievement-oriented behavior.
The negative connotation of achievement striving is just one of six primary
justification mechanisms used in the reasoning of those high in FF to enhance the
logical appeal and justifiability of their avoidance of achievement-oriented behavior
(James, 1998). Each AM and FF justification mechanism (JM) is listed and described
in Table 2.
In sum, when deciding whether or not to approach demanding situations,
individuals high in AM reason in ways that are very different from individuals high in
FF. Whether or not an achievement-oriented behavior is deemed to be reasonable is
thus conditional upon who is doing the reasoning, someone high in AM as opposed to
someone high in FF. An assessment technique designed by James (1998) is now
available to measure this conditional component of the reasoning process.
Measurement of Conditional Reasoning

10

Given the propensity of individuals to believe that their reasoning is rational
and objective, and the corresponding tendency for them to engage in a form of
reasoning that is conditionally biased in favor of their behavioral tendencies, it is
possible to design reasoning items that elicit the conditional tendency. These items
appear to respondents as logical, inductive reasoning problems, but are designed such
that respondents with different implicit cognitions tend to solve the problems in
different ways. Once the conditional tendency is reliably elicited from these items, a
motive to behave in a certain way can be reliably inferred.
As noted earlier, individuals high in AM typically want to believe that their
devotion of effort to accomplishing demanding tasks is reasonable and justified as
opposed to wasteful and obsessive. Alternatively, individuals high in FF typically
want to believe that their avoidance of demanding tasks is sensible and justified as
opposed to lazy and foolish. Consequently, inductive reasoning problems can be
designed around culturally salient, achievement-oriented themes (e.g., the price of
success in terms of health and happiness) that are intended to evoke the respondent's
reliance on JMs. For each problem at least two equally viable and logical response
alternatives are embedded among one or more illogical alternatives to create a
conditional reasoning test (CRT) item. For each CRT item an evocative stem with a
set of premises is given, and at least one of the logical response alternatives is
designed to reveal the implicit motive to approach challenging tasks, whereas at least
one other logical alternative is designed to reveal the implicit motive to avoid
challenges. The former is called the AM alternative whereas the latter is called the FF
11

alternative. Therefore, when AM item responses are counted, and the number of FF
responses is subtracted from this count, the extent of the respondent's reliance on the
JMs that enhance the logical appeal of achievement-oriented behaviors (e.g., intensity
and persistence of effort) is revealed. The resulting score is labeled the respondent’s
Relative Motive Strength (RMS), and is representative of the strength of the
respondent’s implicit motive to achieve.
Each CRT item is typically designed around one or more AM JMs, which stand
juxtaposed to respective and contrasting FF JMs. Consider the following example
CRT item with its stem and response alternatives:
Studies of the stress-related causes of heart attacks led to the identification of the Type
A personality. Type A persons are motivated to achieve, involved in their jobs,
competitive to the point of being aggressive, and eager, wanting things completed
quickly. Interestingly, these same characteristics are often used to describe the
successful person in this country. It would appear that people who wish to strive to be
a success should consider that they will be increasing their risk for a heart attack.
Which one of the following would most weaken the prediction that striving
for success increases the likelihood of having a heart attack?
A. Recent research has shown that it is aggressiveness and impatience, rather than
achievement motivation and job involvement, that are the primary causes of high
stress and heart attacks.
B. Studies of the Type A personality are usually based on information obtained from
interviews and questionnaires.
C. Studies have shown that some people fear being successful.
D. A number of non-ambitious people have heart attacks.
E. People tend to be highly ambitious during the early parts of their careers.

To answer questions such as the one above, each respondent must utilize one
or more implicit assumptions. The CRT items are designed such that the
implicit assumption arrived at in solving the problem may very well be
conditional upon the disposition of the respondent. Response alternatives are
designed to capture this conditional component of reasoning.
12

For this particular item respondents are given the task of determining which of
the response alternatives serves to most weaken the causal link between striving to
achieve and increasing the risk of a heart attack that is presented in the item’s stem.
Notice first that alternatives B, C, and E are not reasonable responses and thus serve as
distracters. These alternatives, which cannot be used to logically weaken the causal
link presented in the stem, help to make CRT items actual reasoning items on which it
is possible to be illogical. Although alternatives B, C, and E are easily identified as
illogical, their presence serves to make the measurement system “indirect.” An
indirect measurement system is one that appears to be measuring one attribute, when
in fact it is measuring a different attribute. Thus, to respondents the CRT appears to
measure inductive reasoning capacity or critical thinking skills, whereas in fact it
measures the extent of the respondents’ reliance on JMs that enhance the logical
appeal of achievement striving behaviors. This indirect nature of the measurement
system is critical as the CRT is used to measure implicit cognitions indicative of the
motives to achieve and to avoid failure that are not accessible to respondents’
introspections. As such, the CRT measures an implicit component of personality not
accessible to self-report.
By eliminating the three illogical alternatives the respondent is left with
alternatives A and D. It should be noted that both alternatives A and D serve to
weaken the prediction that striving for success increases the risk of cardiovascular
disease. However, alternative A posits that an entirely different causal chain is
responsible for cardiovascular disease, whereas alternative D simply acknowledges the
13

fact that achievement strivings and ambitious tendencies do not correlate perfectly
with the development of cardiovascular disease. The causal implications of these
alternatives and the resulting response tendencies of those high in achievement
motivation and those high in fear-of-failure are described below.
By eliminating the three illogical alternatives the respondent is left with
alternatives A and D. Alternative A states that “…it is aggressiveness and impatience,
rather than achievement motivation and job involvement, that are the primary causes
of high stress and heart attacks.” This answer can be logically inferred from the
information given as Type A persons have been described in the stem as “competitive
to the point of being aggressive” and as “wanting things completed quickly.”
Furthermore, alternative A serves to fulfill a requirement of the problem, which is to
select the response alternative that weakens the causal link between achievement
striving and increased risk of cardiovascular disease. Indeed, implied in response A is
the possibility that the causal link between achievement striving and cardiovascular
disease is negligible, because it posits that two other characteristics, aggressiveness
and impatience, are the primary causes of heart attacks. Thus, alternative A is very
logically appealing to those high in AM as it supports the “positive connotation of
achievement striving” JM by disassociating achievement strivings with negative
outcomes, such as stress and increased risk of cardiovascular disease. For this same
reason alternative A is not logically appealing to those high in FF as it contradicts the
“negative connotation of achievement striving” present within their implicit cognitive
framework. In other words, those high in FF would like to maintain the “negative
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connotation of achievement striving” present in the stem, and alternative A is not
appealing because it is in opposition to this JM. In sum, those high in AM are likely to
pick this response whereas those high in FF are not likely to pick this response to solve
the problem. The causal model implied in the stem of this CRT problem is made
explicit in Figure 3, as are the changes to the model that follow from selecting
alternatives A and D, respectively.
As those high in FF will tend to be repelled by the causal implications of
alternative A, they will typically seek an alternative more in harmony with their own
biases. Alternative D provides them with an opportunity to fulfill the requirement of
the problem, which is to weaken the statement that “striving for success increases the
likelihood of having a heart attack,” while still maintaining the positive causal
direction between achievement striving and cardiovascular disease. Specifically,
alternative D maintains the positive causal direction between achievement striving and
cardiovascular disease that coincides with the “negative connotation of achievement
striving” JM contained within the implicit cognitive framework of those high in FF.
As can be seen in Figure 3, alternative D weakens the causal implications of the stem
by simply acknowledging the fact that cardiovascular disease is multiply determined,
and so some “nonambitious people have heart attacks” as well as those striving to
achieve. Thus, alternative D provides those persons high in FF with the opportunity to
avoid the selection of alternative A, which threatens assumptions within their
cognitive framework. Selection of alternative D also allows those high in FF to
maintain their implicit cognitive biases while acknowledging other determinants of
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cardiovascular disease. Thus, selection of alternative D allows those high in FF to
maintain their implicit biases while still solving the requirement of the CRT problem,
which is to weaken the positive link between striving to achieve and the risk of
cardiovascular disease. As a consequence, alternative D should seem logically
appealing to those high in FF, which should lead them to select it in solving the CRT
problem.
Therefore, either response alternative A or D could be logically inferred from
the information provided, but which alternative is given logical priority, and
subsequently chosen, is conditional upon the implicit assumptions of the respondent.
One alternative is based on a JM that implicitly defends, excuses, or otherwise justifies
approaching demanding tasks. The other answer is grounded in a JM that implicitly
defends, excuses, or otherwise justifies avoiding demanding tasks. Which of the two
alternatives a respondent selects to solve the reasoning problem provides a measure of
his/her propensity to reason in terms of AM or FF JMs.
A paper-and-pencil CRT has been developed to measure Relative Motive
Strength. Respondents are instructed that the test is designed to assess the ability to
reason using inference. However, the CRT assesses whether an individual consistently
prefers AM or FF response alternatives when solving inferential reasoning problems.
Respondents who consistently attribute logical priority to alternatives based on JMs
for AM are regarded as cognitively prepared to engage in demanding tasks.
Respondents who consistently attribute logical priority to alternatives based on JMs
for FF are regarded as cognitively prepared to avoid demanding tasks. Respondents
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who consistently select illogical alternatives are considered to be lacking in attention,
understanding, or cooperation. Conditional reasoning test items are scored by
assigning +1 for each AM response alternative selected, 0 for each illogical alternative,
and -1 for each FF response alternative. A few CRT items have, along with the AM
and FF logical alternatives, logical response alternatives that are not scored, and like
illogical alternatives these alternatives are also assigned a value of 0. Scored item
responses are then summed to create a composite score termed Relative Motive
Strength (RMS).
The composite score is an indicator of the extent to which an individual is
cognitively prepared (1) to justify approaching or avoiding challenging situations and
(2) to devote intense effort or to withhold effort when faced with demanding tasks. A
high score on the CRT (e.g., 1 SD above the mean) occurs when an individual tends to
select AM responses over FF responses, and from this high score it is inferred that the
individual has a corresponding motive to approach challenging situations and to put
forth large amounts of effort when faced with demanding tasks. A low score (e.g., 1
SD below the mean) on the CRT occurs when an individual tends to select FF
responses over AM responses, and from this low score it is inferred that the individual
has a corresponding propensity to avoid challenging situations and to typically
withhold effort when faced with demanding tasks.
In sum, the conditional reasoning test of RMS is an indirect measure of a
generally unrecognized proclivity to rationalize approach or avoidance of challenging
situations from which the motive to achieve is inferred. Respondents may thus reveal
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in the conditional reasoning test implicit cognitions of which they are unaware, and
thus cannot describe in self-report (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; James et al., under
review). Consequently, the integration of self-report and conditional reasoning
methodologies should allow for an assessment of the complexities of AM and FF that
cannot be captured via the independent use of these techniques.
Integrative Model of Achievement Motivation and Fear-of-Failure
I turn now to a proposal of how conditional reasoning might be joined with the
most popular measure of personality, self-report, to predict behavior. Multiple
avenues are available for pursuing this subject. The current approach expands on
recent theory and research by Winter et al. (1998), who demonstrated that self-reports
of consistencies in behaviors (i.e., traits) served to channel the emotional and
behavioral expression of latent motives as measured by the TAT. As mentioned
above, Winter et al. (1998) focused on integrating power and affiliation motives with
the trait of extraversion, and although the current research is similar to that of Winter
et al. (1998) and McClelland (1985), there are several important aspects on which
these pursuits differ.
First, the current work extends the concept of the integrative model of
assessment to a personality construct examined only briefly in this fashion by
McClelland (1985), namely achievement motivation (AM). In the integrative works
on AM reviewed by McClelland (1985), the motive to achieve was manipulated
experimentally via situational cues and was not measured in terms of individual
differences as it is in the current work. Consequently, the integrative model presented
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here for AM and FF is original and unique in that it has not been described elsewhere,
utilizes a new measure of AM, and proposes new explanations of approach-avoidance
conflicts.
Second, Winter et al. (1998) utilized the TAT to measure latent motives
independently of the component assessed by self-reports, whereas the current work
utilizes the CRT. As noted above and by James (1998), there are a number of
differences between these two measurement systems. The TAT emphasizes individual
differences in fantasy for the purposes of assessment, whereas the CRT emphasizes
individual differences in reasoning. The TAT utilizes a free response format and is
scored on the basis of a subjective content analysis, whereas the CRT utilizes a
standardized response format and is scored on the basis of theoretically fixed, and
empirically confirmed procedures (James, 1998). Finally, a highly trained technician
must administer the TAT in a serial and one-on-one fashion to respondents, whereas
the CRT can be administered in parallel and group fashion to multiple respondents like
other standardized tests, making the CRT more applicable to organizational settings
and thus useful to those involved in personnel selection. Therefore, the following
investigations shall focus on how self-reports can be integrated with conditional
reasoning to provide a fuller understanding of personality, specifically AM and FF,
which cannot be provided by either measurement system when used in isolation.
As stated earlier, RMS measures implicit cognitions, or a generally
unrecognized cognitive preparedness to approach demanding tasks, from which the
motive to achieve may be inferred. However, RMS does not measure the explicit
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cognitions that are relevant to achievement motivation. Alternatively, self-reports
have been used for some time now to obtain measures of achievement motivation.
Unlike the TAT and the CRT, self-reports are “direct” in that they ask respondents to
recognize their own characteristic behaviors, preferences, and emotions in order to
give accurate item responses. As such, responses to self-reports must pass through
self-perceptions and introspections that may be influenced by self-presentation biases,
such as self-deception and impression management (Paulhus, 1984; Rosse, Stecher,
Miller, & Levin, 1998). Consequently, self-reports often serve to access the explicit
cognitions relevant to achievement motivation, and even though self-presentation
biases may alter their accuracy, self-perceptions of behaviors, preferences, and
emotions remain substantial components of personality (see Hogan, Hogan, &
Roberts, 1996). Thus, for the adequate assessment of achievement motivation it is
simply important to consider how individuals view themselves, even though the lens
for viewing may be rosy.
In sum, self-reports assess self-attributed traits and motives that are available to
introspection. The CRT, on the other hand, is a relatively new indirect measure of
personality that assesses latent motives (James, 1998). The CRT is based on the
assumption that individuals have latent justification mechanisms (JMs) that they use to
justify, defend, and explain their behavior. These JMs are part of the individual’s
underlying or implicit cognitive belief structure. Therefore, as these methodologies
assess different components of personality, their integration may allow for a unique
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assessment of personality that cannot be captured via the independent use of these
techniques.
In pursuit of the integrative model I became especially intrigued with the
question of what happens when explicit cognitions of behavioral tendencies (i.e., selfattributed traits and motives), as measured by self-reports, are congruent or
incongruent with implicit cognitions (i.e., latent motives), as measured by the CRT.
To wit, I built a theoretical model of AM and FF that integrated explicit cognitions
from self-reports with implicit cognitions from conditional reasoning. This model is
presented in Table 3. At the left side of the model are presented items from selfreports (e.g., Jackson’s PRF, 1984; Costa & McCrae’s NEO-PI-R, 1992) that are used
to measure self-perceptions of goals, work efforts, and desires that are indicative of
achievement motivation. Below these items are those that reflect a fear-of failure. At
the top of the model are the JMs for people whose RMS indicates FF as well as the
JMs for those whose RMS indicates AM.
The four inner cells of the model reflect an attempt to build a typology for
achievement motivation and fear-of-failure via integrating these two sources of
information. This integration resulted in the creation of descriptions of pure types, or
of prototypical individuals within each cell (e.g., a clear RMS of AM versus a clear
RMS of FF crossed with high versus low self-perceptions of achievement motivation).
In truth, a continuum exists for both self-reports of achievement motivation and RMS,
and crossing these two continua generates a large number of cells representing degrees
of variation between the prototypes presented in the cells. However, for simplification
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purposes intermediate cells have been left out of Table 3 as well as the discussion of
the model provided below.
The upper-right cell consists of persons who view themselves as achievement
motivated and who possess the corresponding JMs to enhance the logical appeal of
achievement behaviors. Members of this cell were designated “Congruent AMs” to
denote that motives revealed by reasoning proclivities are compatible with selfdescriptions of behavioral/emotional propensities. These individuals are predicted to
be ambitious, aspiring, and industrious. They are also predicted to put forth a lot of
effort when faced with demanding tasks, and to interpret failure as both temporary and
an opportunity to learn via increased effort (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Moreover, they
have a personal responsibility bias that favors the attribution of success and failure to
internal rather than external factors (cf. Bandura, 1982, 1986a, 1986b; James, 1998;
McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982). Specifically, they tend to believe that internal factors,
such as self-efficacy, self-discipline, and volitional effort, can be controlled and
utilized to overcome the obstacles faced when attempting to accomplish challenging
tasks, and to eventually achieve their goals. Their achievement striving behaviors are
supported by their reliance on AM JMs that encourage the framing of demanding goals
as opportunities worthy of effort and sacrifice, where enthusiasm and perseverance
will eventually produce success (James, 1998; McClelland, 1985; McClelland et al.,
1989).
The lower-left cell contains individuals who consciously view themselves as
low in achievement motivation and anxious in challenging situations, and who reason
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on the basis of FF JMs to rationalize avoiding challenging situations that could cause
them psychological damage (e.g., feelings of incompetence) should they fail in those
situations. In other words, the FF JMs that dampen enthusiasm for achievement and
justify avoidance of challenging achievement activities serve to protect selfperceptions (i.e., self-reports) that are suggestive of a fear-of-failure. These
individuals interpret failures as being indicative of fixed, inadequate levels of ability
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Thus, when encountering setbacks and failures, these
individuals attribute those failures to their embodiment of a fixed, inadequate level of
ability, and this internalized attribution causes them to experience subsequent aversive
psychological states (e.g., feelings of inadequacy, anger, guilt, helplessness, lowered
self-esteem; Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Bandura, 1982; Crocker &
Major, 1989; Weiner, 1979, 1985). Consequently, these persons have a propensity to
frame demanding, achievement-related tasks as personal liabilities and threats (see
Atkinson, 1957; James, 1998) because attempts to complete demanding tasks are
likely to involve setbacks that could lead to eventual failure, and this failure will lead
to the experience of aversive psychological states. As a result, these persons often
prevent these aversive psychological states proactively by not approaching demanding,
challenging tasks and by avoiding challenging situations altogether. Thus, these
individuals are “Congruent FFs” and are predicted to generally avoid achievementoriented activities, to be anxious when in challenging situations, and to perhaps
withdrawal from challenge when failure appears likely, as long as such withdrawal is
not also psychologically damaging. Consequently, when faced with challenging
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situations in which withdrawal is not feasible or withdrawal would be psychologically
damaging, individuals in this cell may generate high levels of effort to succeed and
thus avoid the feelings of incompetence and the negative emotions that would result
from failure.
The lower-right cell involves individuals who see themselves as nonachievers
but who, incongruously, reason in ways that enhance the rational appeal of
achievement. These individuals are predicted to have conscious concerns for the stress
that high achievers can encounter, and for the obsessions that can result from the
devotion to achievement. These concerns may dampen and even inhibit their strong
latent motive to achieve. The tendency of those in this cell to reason in ways that
justify approaching demanding tasks is likely to produce strong approach-avoidance
conflicts with the self-perception of being cautious and stress avoidant. When their
underlying reasoning proclivities are manifested, approach of achievement-oriented
tasks and situations will occur, but this approach will likely be a careful, deliberate
one. Furthermore, this approach should also be subject to termination if stress is
encountered. Consequently, the individuals in this lower-right cell were labeled
“Hesitant AMs.”
Finally, the upper-left cell of Table 3 contains individuals who see themselves
as high achievers but who incongruously have FF JMs in place. Thus, these
individuals are predicted to experience conscious pressure to approach achievementoriented tasks, but to feel nervous and anxious when so doing. Thus, like Congruent
FFs, these individuals are also predicted to be nervous and anxious when faced with
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demanding tasks. However, for these individuals the FF JMs are predicted to play a
proactive role in reducing this anxiety by leading them to approach only those
achievement-oriented tasks for which an external attribution for failure can easily be
made. They may also purposely avoid responsibility for failure by engaging in the
unnecessary delegation of responsibility to others, such as when an executive forms a
team for the generation of a decision that he or she should make alone (James &
Mazerolle, 2002). Also, when faced with demanding tasks, they may simply withhold
effort to rationalize subsequent and likely failure. Consequently, these individuals
may withdrawal from challenging situations altogether when failure becomes likely.
Thus, the individuals in this upper-left cell were labeled “AM Pretenders” because
they fear failure but want to be viewed by themselves and by others as achievementoriented.
Empirical Predictions of the Integrative Model
In 1983 Cooper reviewed and conducted several studies to assess whether
seven standard dependent variables belonged within the nomological network of
achievement motivation: initial task choice, persistence, performance, valence of
success, valence of failure, task difficulty estimates, and the Zeigarnik effect. Initial
task choice, persistence, performance, and the Zeigarnik effect were measured
objectively and independently of the predictor motives, that is the motives to approach
success and to avoid failure. Alternatively, valence of success, valence of failure, and
task difficulty estimates were measured subjectively and with the same method used to
assess self-reported predictor motives. Cooper's (1983) results indicated that all of the
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dependent variables, save the Zeigarnik effect, belonged within the network.
Additionally, the results revealed difficulties in the prediction of initial task choice.
Therefore, for the current tests of the integrative model both persistence and
performance were chosen as dependent variables because they can be assessed
objectively and independently of the study predictors, especially self-report predictors,
and they remained clearly within the nomological network of achievement motivation
according to Cooper's (1983) findings.
However, the current work took the perspective that the dependent variable of
persistence is only one of three behavioral components that combine to form an overall
level of effort. Figure 4 displays this multidimensional view of effort as being a
function of the particular task one chooses to engage in, how intensely one works on
that task, and how long one persists in accomplishing the task. Thus, for example, in
the figure Person 1 can be seen as putting forth less effort on Task 1 than Person 2.
Furthermore, Person 1 stops working on Task 1 before Person 2, and thus is less
persistent than Person 2 in accomplishing the task. However, Person 3 is working
harder than both Person 1 and Person 2, but on a different task (i.e., Task 2). It should
be noted that task choice, intensity, and persistence are often correlated, as one can
choose a certain task to work on at the expense of another task, choose to work with
little or no intensity, and choose to persist or to quit.
Therefore, both persistence and intensity were measured to provide an
indication of an overall level of effort, and performance measures were also used to
complete the set of dependent variables pursued in the current work. It should be
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noted here that the performance measures used in these studies were certainly tainted
with effort as one must almost always put forth effort in order to perform well (e.g.,
one must typically concentrate and read a test item to answer it correctly, one must
attend class lectures and tests to perform well in a course, one must show up to work
to perform well on the on-site work tasks, etc.). Two general predictions were derived
when considering the prototypes of the integrative model in conjunction with the
findings of past research. These predictions are displayed in Figure 5, and described
below.
By continually setting mastery as opposed to performance goals, over time
Congruent AMs tend to approach challenging tasks in which they may fail because
incidents of failure are interpreted as opportunities to improve a malleable level of
ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Thus, due to their adaptive tendencies, over time
Congruent AMs acquire the habit of putting forth high levels of effort when faced with
challenging tasks and thus acquire the requisite skills for obtaining high levels of
performance. Alternatively, Hesitant AMs are more calculating in their approach of
challenging tasks, and typically do so only when a return-on-investment from
expended effort is clearly evident. Hesitant AMs are also more likely than Congruent
AMs to discontinue the pursuit of completing challenging tasks when stress is
encountered. Thus, they were predicted to put forth less effort than Congruent AMs,
and to have lower levels of performance in comparison to Congruent AMs.
By continually setting performance as opposed to mastery goals, over time
Congruent FFs tend to avoid challenging tasks in which they may fail because
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incidents of failure are interpreted as indicating a fixed level of inadequate ability, and
subsequently cause psychological damage (e.g., lower self-esteem). Thus, due to their
avoidant, maladaptive tendencies, over time Congruent FFs do not acquire the skills
necessary for obtaining high levels of performance in comparison to Congruent AMs
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988). However, when faced with challenging situations in which
withdrawal is not feasible, or in which withdrawal would be as psychologically
damaging as failure, Congruent FFs may put forth levels of effort comparable to
Congruent AMs in order to avoid failure and the negative affect that it generates
(Jones, 1973). As AM Pretenders sometimes experience conscious pressure to
approach challenging tasks, they may not be quite as historically avoidant as
Congruent FFs, and thus AM Pretenders may develop more performance-relevant
skills than Congruent FFs. Thus, AM Pretenders were predicted to reach levels of
effort and performance generally above that of Congruent FFs, but levels of effort and
performance below that of Congruent AMs.
The above predictions were used to generate the relationships depicted in
Figure 5. In the case in which withdrawal from challenge is feasible, Congruent AMs
were predicted to reach the highest levels of effort and performance in comparison to
the other prototypes, and Congruent FFs were predicted to attain the lowest levels of
effort and performance. These expectations are displayed in the upper graph of Figure
5, where an additive pattern between RMS and self-reported achievement motivation
in the prediction of effort and performance is shown. However, in the lower graph of
Figure 5 is displayed the case in which Congruent FFs perceive the situation to be one
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in which withdrawal would be psychologically damaging or unfeasible (e.g., socially
unacceptable), and thus they would generate high levels of effort to avoid failure.
Consequently, the relationship between RMS and self-reported achievement
motivation in the prediction of effort when withdrawal is not feasible is displayed as
disordinal and multiplicative.
In each empirical investigation described below, measures of cognitive ability
were obtained because past research has demonstrated its importance in the prediction
of effort and performance (see Dollinger & Orf, 1991; Hunter, 1986; Hunter & Hunter,
1984; Judge, Higgins, Thoresen, & Barrick, 1999; Maqsud, 1997; Pajares & Kranzler,
1995; Pearlman, Schmidt, & Hunter, 1980; Schippmann & Prien, 1989; Schmidt,
Gast-Rosenberg, & Hunter, 1980; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Schmidt, Hunter, &
Caplan, 1981; Youngstrom, Cogos, & Glutting, 1999). Thus, incorporating cognitive
ability into the empirical tests of the integrative model allowed for the determination
of the incremental validity of the model in predicting effort and performance above
and beyond that predicted by cognitive ability. A number of researchers have
suggested that a new assessment technique (e.g., the integrative model) should
demonstrate incremental validity above and beyond established assessments (e.g.,
cognitive ability) to be deemed pragmatic and value-added in application (see
Cronbach & Gleser, 1957; Day & Silverman, 1989; Sechrest, 1963). As such, the
incremental validity of the integrative model, and thus the theoretical and practical
value-added nature of the model, could be determined.
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Three studies were conducted to test the predictions of the integrative model.
In all three studies a self-report of achievement motivation and the CRT were
administered to the research participants. A measure of cognitive ability was also
obtained in each study. Studies 1 and 2 utilized college student samples, whereas
Study 3 utilized working adults competing for managerial positions.
Study 1a tested the integrative model by measuring persistence and intensity of
effort devoted to completing problems (i.e., cryptoquote puzzles) that were unknown
by the participants to be impossible to solve. Study 1b tested the integrative model by
measuring performance on increasingly difficult math problems. Study 1c tested the
model by assessing academic performance in terms of final course grade and
cumulative grade point average (GPA). Study 2 was conducted as a replication of
Study 1c, and as such also assessed academic performance in terms of final course
grade and cumulative GPA. Study 3 tested the integrative model by assessing inbasket performance and overall performance in an assessment center.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1A
The first study was conducted to determine the ability of the integrative model
to predict both persistence and intensity of effort devoted to a task performed under
severe time constraints (i.e., a total of 15 minutes to solve seven problems). Each
problem was known to be impossible to solve by the experimenters, but not by the
student participants. Indeed, the participants were given practice problems with
simple solutions prior to beginning the unsolvable problems in order to make the latter
problems appear solvable. Additionally, each participant was required to attempt to
solve the problems sequentially, and not allowed to return to a previous problem once
it was abandoned. Therefore, for the seven unsolvable problems, attempting to solve
the second problem indicated that the participant did not persist in attempting to solve
the first problem, and attempting to solve the third problem indicated that the
participant did not persist in attempting to solve the second, and so forth.
Consequently, participants who attempted fewer problems were more persistent
(Burger, 1985). The amount of time devoted to solving an impossible problem has
been used in past research as a measure of persistence, and this persistence has been
linked with higher levels of achievement motivation (Burger, 1985; Cooper, 1983;
Feather, 1961).
However, in the current study the participants were unaware that they would be
faced with problems that they could not solve and thus were placed in a very
challenging situation. Additionally, the experimenters made the task evocative by
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emphasizing in the instructions that being able to solve mental problems “reveals
mental abilities.” Consequently, in this study Congruent FFs were faced with a
challenging situation that they might normally avoid, but one in which they might be
likely to set high performance goals to demonstrate an adequate level of what they
believe to be a ‘fixed’ ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Alternatively, given their
habit of putting forth effort when faced with challenge, Congruent AMs were
predicted to set equally high, yet mastery-oriented goals to increase what they believe
to be a ‘malleable’ level of ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). As Hesitant AMs and
AM Pretenders were not expected to set such goals in comparison to the Congruent
AMs and FFs, the multiplicative pattern shown in the bottom of Figure 5 was
predicted to emerge.
Alternatively, the possibility that Congruent FFs would not set high
performance goals, and instead simply discount the experimental task by withholding
effort must also be considered. In other words, by withholding effort from tasks
Congruent FFs can create an ego-protecting a priori reason for failure (i.e., the fact that
they did not try), and the subsequent rationalization that had they tried they would
have met success instead of failure. Under this condition, Congruent FFs might
remain on the first unsolvable problem while waiting for the experimental session to
end instead of devoting effort to its solution, and thus appear to persist in solving the
first problem. This possibility would also lead to the multiplicative pattern in Figure 5
with respect to the prediction of persistence. As a result, Congruent FFs could set
high performance goals and truly persist to avoid failure, or discount the task
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altogether to rationalize subsequent failure. Either strategy could be used to protect
them from experiencing the negative affect that failure generates (e.g., feelings of
having an inadequate level of fixed ability), and a multiplicative prediction of
persistence via the integrative model could not be unambiguously interpreted were
persistence to be the only dependent variable measured.
However, intensity of effort devoted to solving each problem was also
measured in order to resolve this theoretical quandary. Consequently, were Congruent
FFs to discount the experimental task in comparison to other prototypes, and yet
remain on the first problem without attempting a solution, then the measure of
intensity would reveal this lack of effort via producing the additive pattern shown in
the top of Figure 5. Such an additive pattern for the prediction of intensity of effort
would indicate that the “persistence” of Congruent FFs, if found, was not a function of
pursuing a high performance goal, but instead a dismissal of the task in order to
rationalize subsequent task failure. Thus, whether Congruent FFs would set strong
performance goals resulting in true persistence and intensity of effort, or simply
discount the experimental task in order to rationalize subsequent failure, was a central
question of Study 1a, and the measure of intensity of effort was used to provide an
answer.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 110 undergraduate students attending an introductory
database management course in the college of business administration at a university
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in the southeastern United States. The students participated in the study for the
purpose of earning extra credit applicable to their course grade. With participants’
permission, final course grade and cumulative GPA were obtained from the
university’s registrar at the end of the semester. The sample was roughly 30% female,
and had an approximate mean age of 21 years (SD = 3.00).
Predictor Measures
Relative Motive Strength (RMS). The paper-and-pencil conditional reasoning
test (CRT) of achievement motivation (AM) and fear-of-failure (FF) was used to
measure RMS. The instructions for the CRT present it as a test that “is designed to
assess reasoning skills,” and at no time did the participants give any indication that
they believed the test to be assessing anything other than reasoning skills. The CRT
consists of 15 inductive reasoning items designed to assess a generally unrecognized
proclivity for engaging in achievement-related tasks versus avoiding such tasks
(James, 1998). Conditional reasoning test items are scored by assigning +1 to each
AM response alternative selected, 0 to each illogical alternative, and -1 to each FF
response alternative. A few CRT items have logical response alternatives that are not
scored, and like illogical alternatives these are also assigned a value of 0 (James,
1998). Scored item responses are then summed to create a composite score termed
Relative Motive Strength (RMS). Relative motive strength composite scores have a
potential range of –15 to +15, with higher scores indicating an orientation toward
achievement motivation and lower scores indicating an orientation toward fear-offailure.
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Past research has indicated a satisfactory level of internal consistency for RMS
composite scores. For example, in an investigation by James (1998), internal
consistency reliability estimates for RMS ranged from .81 to .89. In the current study,
the Kuder-Richardson (Formula 20) coefficient based on the average of the item-total
polyserial correlations produced an internal consistency reliability estimate of .73 for
the RMS composite scores.3 Past research has also demonstrated that RMS is a valid
predictor of behavioral indicators of achievement, such as mean level of performance
on in-class exams and overall grade point average (see James, 1998).
Self-Report of Achievement Motivation. A six-item scale using a semantic
differential format was used to measure the explicit, self-perceived component of
achievement motivation. An example item from this scale is the following semantic
differential:
“I would like to be a high achiever
at school, but am not hung up
about it.

1 2

3 4 5

I have a burning desire to be a high
achiever at school.”

3 4 5

I always try to set very challenging
goals for myself at school.”

An additional example item is shown below.
“I prefer to set reasonable goals for

1 2

myself at school.
The instructions indicated that when providing responses to the items the participants
should consider how they typically act, think, and feel at school when attending class
and when doing homework. The participants responded to this semantic differential
3

The item-total polyserial correlations were used in place of item-total Pearson correlations to estimate
scale reliability because the trichotomous item responses were assumed to be the result of a continuous
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item format by checking the box next to the number in the 5-point Likert scale that
best represented where their preference or behavior stood in relation to the opposing,
paired statements. Specifically, participants were instructed to select the number "3" if
undecided or neutral about the statements, "1" if the statement on the left strongly
represented their preference or behavior, "2" if the statement on the left represented
their preference or behavior somewhat more accurately than the statement on the right,
and so forth. Items responses were coded and averaged such that higher composite
scale scores represented higher levels of self-perceived achievement motivation.
An internal consistency reliability estimate of .69 was obtained via coefficient
alpha for this measure of self-perceived achievement motivation. Although this
measure of self-reported achievement motivation was developed for the current study,
and thus has no prior evidence of validity given its novelty, as shown below (see Table
5) it correlated significantly with course grade (.20, p < .05) and in the direction one
would expect between motivation and performance (i.e., in the positive direction).
Cognitive Ability. In order to control for individual differences in cognitive
ability, and to determine the capacity of the integrative model to predict variance in
effort and performance above and beyond cognitive ability, ACT and SAT scores were
collected from the university’s registrar with the permission of the participants. When
only the SAT score was available for a participant that score was converted to an
equivalent ACT score via conversion tables (Schneider & Dorans, 1999).
Criterion Measures
latent construct, and re-estimation of item-total Pearson correlations via item-total polyserials provides
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Unsolvable cryptoquote puzzles have been used in past research to provide a
behavioral measure of persistence (see Burger, 1985). In the current study, the
cryptoquote task was presented as a test of verbal and problem solving ability.
Appendix C presents the instructions for the cryptoquote task, the first of the three
solvable cryptoquote practice puzzles, and the first of the seven unsolvable
cryptoquote test puzzles. The practice cryptoquote puzzles consisted of a series of
coded letters that represented well-known quotes or phrases. To solve these practice
cryptoquote puzzles, one must figure out the code for each letter, and thereby
determine the correct letter that each coded letter in the series actually represents. By
substituting the correct letters for the coded letters in the practice cryptoquote, the
well-known phrase can be deduced. For example, within a practice cryptoquote puzzle
the letter U may represent the letter T, and thus every time the letter U appears in the
puzzle the letter T should be substituted in order to deduce the correct phrase. Test
cryptoquote puzzles appeared in the same format as practice cryptoquote puzzles, with
the difference being that test puzzles did not represent quotes or phrases, and thus
could not be solved.
The participants were given seven minutes to solve the three practice
cryptoquotes, and fifteen minutes to solve the seven test cryptoquotes. A workspace
beneath each puzzle was provided for the participants to work through the solution and
deduce the correct phrase (see Appendix C). Following Burger (1985), practice
cryptoquotes were partially solved for the participants, such that a few correct letters

for increased generalizability of the resulting reliability coefficient to other samples.
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were already presented in the workspace below the practice cryptoquotes. Participants
were not given any such aid on the unsolvable test cryptoquote puzzles. The lack of
aid provided on the test puzzles served to make the shift from solving three practice
puzzles to total failure on the test plausible. Over 98% of the participants solved all
three practice puzzles, and at no time did the participants give any indication that they
believed the test puzzles to be unsolvable.
Within the practice and test sessions the participants could allocate the total
amount of time given to solve the problems however they chose within the following
restrictions. First, participants had to check a box in the upper right-hand corner of the
page before attempting to solve the cryptoquote puzzle that appeared on that page.
Second, once the participants began a new puzzle they were not allowed to return to
any of the previous puzzles. In this fashion the experimenters could determine
whether or not the participants worked on a puzzle even if they did not write in the
workspace below the puzzle, and could also count how many puzzles the participants
attempted.
The above methodology allowed the experimenters to record the number of
cryptoquotes attempted by each participant. Recall that because the test cryptoquotes
were unsolvable, attempting to solve later test cryptoquotes indicated that the
participant did not persist in attempting to solve earlier test cryptoquotes. Test
cryptoquote puzzles were scored as attempted (1) and not attempted (0). Thus, this
methodology allowed for a measure of persistence by summating the number of
puzzles attempted and subtracting this value from the number eight. This resulting
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variable was termed “persistence,” and had a range from 1 to 7 with higher scores
indicating higher levels of persistence. Using coefficient alpha, an internal consistency
reliability estimate of .81 was obtained for the cryptoquote measure of persistence.
Additionally, the amount of work participants performed in attempting to solve
each test cryptoquote puzzle was measured by counting the number of characters
written in and outside the workspace for each puzzle. For example, if the participant
wrote “a = t" and "c = e” anywhere on the page when trying to solve a particular
puzzle, then the participant received a six for that puzzle to indicate the level of
intensity of effort the participant devoted to solving that puzzle. Two experimenters
independently counted the number of characters written on each cryptoquote puzzle
page. A discrepancy occurred in only two instances (i.e., in only 0.26% of the possible
comparisons), and in each instance the discrepancy was resolved via consensus. The
total number of characters written when attempting to solve the seven test
cryptoquotes was then summed to create a dependent variable termed “total intensity,”
with higher scores on this variable indicating higher levels of intensity of effort
devoted to solving cryptoquote problems. However, as some participants attempted
only the first test cryptoquote (i.e., they spent the entire allotted 15 minutes on the first
test cryptoquote puzzle), their intensity on later problems was scored as zero, and for
these individuals the total intensity variable might have appeared abnormally low
considering their persistence. Thus, the total intensity variable was also divided by the
number of cryptoquotes attempted to provide the average level of intensity of effort
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expended per problem attempted. As this final dependent variable was a function of
both persistence and intensity, it was simply termed “effort.”
Procedure
The opportunity to earn extra credit by serving as a research participant was
announced in class. The participants were told that they could choose to attend one of
several identical research sessions that would be offered, and that each session would
last approximately 2 hours and involve completing several paper-and-pencil tests. The
same tests were administered at each session, and the order of test administration did
not vary across the sessions.
Participants completed informed consent forms at the beginning of each
session. The CRT was the first test administered at each session, and took
approximately 45 minutes to complete. The CRT was followed by a brief math test
(see Study 1b), which took approximately 20 minutes to complete. The math test was
followed by the cryptoquote task, which took approximately 45 minutes to complete,
and was followed by a short survey that took approximately 10 minutes to complete.4
Following the methodology utilized by Burger (1985), the cryptoquote
instructions were read aloud to the participants. The instructions presented the
cryptoquote task as a test of “verbal and problem solving abilities,” and provided a
definition of a cryptoquote. An example cryptoquote puzzle was then presented and

4

The Study 1a, 1b, and 1c data were part of a larger validation study for the conditional reasoning test
of AM and FF. As such, although I pursued the theoretical development of the integrative model and its
predictions and results independently, the data were gathered in cooperation with other graduate
students in Dr. Lawrence R. James’ research laboratory. These graduate students of Dr. Lawrence R.
James (e.g., Jennifer Burgess, Debrah Zegelbone-Migetz, William Walton, & David Vermillion)
conducted other studies on the same sample of research participants.
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described to illustrate how the cryptoquotes can be solved. At this point in the
instructions the experimenters stated that “solving mental puzzles reveals mental
abilities” in an attempt to make the cryptoquote task evocative to the participants.
The instructions also informed the participants that prior to working on a
cryptoquote’s solution, they should place a check mark in a box in the upper righthand corner of the page on which the cryptoquote was located. The instructions stated
that the cryptoquotes were to be worked on in the order in which they were presented,
that a cryptoquote problem should not be skipped, and that a cryptoquote problem
should not be returned to once it had been passed. The participants were told they
could use the workspace below each cryptoquote as well as the rest of the space on the
page to generate a solution. Several strategies and guidelines were provided to help
the participants solve the cryptoquotes. The practice session began at the
experimenter’s signal once it was determined that all of the participants understood the
task. The participants were told to stop working on the practice puzzles at the end of
seven minutes. At the end of the practice session the following instructions for the test
session were read to the participants:
Attached to this page are seven test cryptoquotes. You
will have fifteen minutes to solve them. Please note that
each cryptoquote has its own page. Prior to working on
a cryptoquote please check the box in the upper right
hand portion of the page on which the cryptoquote is
located. Please solve the cryptoquotes in order, without
skipping one. Once you have turned the page to work on
the next cryptoquote please do not return to ones that
you have already passed. You can only go forward to
work on additional cryptoquotes, and only in the order in
which they are presented. Beneath each cryptoquote are
several blanks with which you can test out various
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solutions. Feel free to use these blanks, as well as the
rest of the page, for scratch paper.
At the experimenter’s signal the test session began. Once fifteen minutes had passed
the participants stopped working on the cryptoquotes, and turned to the back of the
booklet where they completed a brief survey that included the self-report of
achievement motivation. The final survey took approximately 10 minutes to complete.
Once the participants completed the final survey all of the materials were collected,
and the participants were told that debriefing forms would be made available at the
end of the semester once the last session had been held. At the end of the semester the
debriefing forms were made available to the participants, and final course grades,
cumulative GPAs, ACT scores, and SAT scores were obtained from the university’s
registrar.
Results
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of the Study 1a variables.
The mean RMS composite score was 2.67 (SD = 4.79), and the mean self-report of
achievement motivation was 2.88 (SD = .70). The mean ACT composite score was
23.13 (SD = 3.54). The mean level of persistence was 4.39 (SD = 1.54), and the mean
level of effort (i.e., total intensity divided by the number of cryptoquotes attempted)
was 23.31 (SD = 16.30).
Table 5 presents the intercorrelations of the Study 1a variables. As can be seen
from the table, RMS did not correlate significantly with self-reported AM (r = .09, p >
.10). This supports the earlier assertion that the CRT serves as a measure of generally
unrecognized implicit achievement motives that are often not significantly related to
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self-reported, and thus self-attributed, explicit achievement motives. This finding is
entirely consistent with past empirical research (James, 1998; McClelland et al., 1989,
p. 691). Further, RMS correlated significantly with ACT composite scores (r = .35, p
< .01), whereas self-reported AM did not (r = -.03, p > .10). The nonsignificant
relation between self-reported AM and ACT composite scores might suggest that the
covariation between RMS and ACT scores could be due to method variance in that
both the CRT and the ACT entrance exam require levels of reading comprehension
above those required by self-report measures. However, the covariation between RMS
and ACT composite scores is more likely due to a cyclical nonrecursive model of the
development of implicit achievement motivation and critical intellectual skills because
a concerted effort was made to insure logical parity between CRT AM and FF
response alternatives (cf. James, 1998).
RMS did not obtain significant correlations with the Study 1a criteria (i.e.,
persistence, intensity on the 1st cryptoquote, total intensity, and effort). The self-report
of achievement motivation obtained significant and negative correlations with two of
the Study 1a criteria. Specifically, self-report correlated with persistence (r = -.17, p <
.10) and effort (r = -.15, p < .10). ACT composite correlated significantly with
intensity on the 1st cryptoquote (r = .16, p < .10) and total intensity (r = .28, p < .01),
but did not correlate significantly with the other Study 1a criteria.
Central to Study 1a was the hypothesis that the integrative model would predict
variance in persistence, intensity, and effort beyond that predicted by RMS and selfreported AM when used in isolation. Specifically, were Congruent AMs to set high
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mastery goals and Congruent FFs to set high performance goals in comparison to the
other prototypes (i.e., Hesitant AMs and AM Pretenders), then the multiplicative
interaction depicted in the lower graph of Figure 5 would be obtained, and variance in
the criteria would be predicted by the interaction of RMS and self-report AM above
and beyond that explained via their main effects. Alternatively, were Congruent AMs
to set high mastery goals and Congruent FFs to discount the task in comparison to the
other prototypes, then the multiplicative pattern would still hold for the prediction of
persistence (see above), but the additive pattern displayed in the upper graph of Figure
5 would be obtained for intensity. Finally, because cognitive ability is known to be a
powerful predictor of achievement-related behaviors (e.g., Schippmann & Prien, 1989;
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), it was controlled for statistically to determine the
incremental validity of the integrative model.
To test the predictions of the integrative model I utilized a moderated
hierarchical multiple regression (MHMR) procedure. The MHMR procedure is
usually a more powerful detector of interactions between continuous predictors in
comparison to the artificial categorization of those predictors and subsequent ANOVA
or subgroup-based correlation coefficient procedures (Cohen, 1983; Stone-Romero &
Anderson, 1994). Specifically, the ANOVA procedures conducted on continuous
predictors are typically inadequate because they require an arbitrary categorization of
the predictors, which results in a loss of information in the predictors and a subsequent
reduction in statistical power (Cohen, 1983, 1990; Humphreys, 1978; Stone-Romero &
Anderson, 1994; however, see McClelland & Judd, 1993, for an opposing viewpoint).
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MHMR was used to determine whether or not the relationship between RMS
and each criterion was contingent upon the level of self-reported AM. Consequently,
all measures were standardized and the product between RMS and self-reported AM
was calculated to form the interaction term. Each criterion was subsequently regressed
onto RMS and self-reported AM in Step 1, and then onto both predictors and their
interaction term (i.e., cross-product) in Step 2. Moderated hierarchical multiple
regression assessed whether or not the interaction term entered in Step 2 made a
unique contribution to the explanation of variance in the criterion above and beyond
the main effects of the predictors that were entered in Step 1 and subsequently
partialled from the interaction term in Step 2 of the procedure (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

Every MHMR analysis was conducted twice, first without controlling for
cognitive ability, and then with controlling for cognitive ability via entering cognitive
ability scores on the first step of the regression equation along with RMS and selfreported AM. This procedure served to determine whether or not the integrative
model could demonstrate incremental validity above and beyond cognitive ability.
Were the validity of the integrative model to deteriorate substantially in the presence
of cognitive ability, then the value-added nature of the model would be called into
question.
The results of the Study 1a MHMR analyses conducted without and with ACT
scores entered on the first step are presented in Table 6. Persistence was the first
criterion analyzed via MHMR. In the analysis without controlling for cognitive
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ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1 did not lead to a significant
increase in the amount of variance explained (i.e., R2) in persistence, F(2, 79) = 1.23, p
> .10. However, entry of the RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 led
to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 78) = 9.10, p < .01. Therefore, RMS and selfreported AM interacted to explain a significant amount of variance in persistence (i.e.,
10%) above and beyond the variance explained by the main effects. In the analysis in
which cognitive ability was controlled for, entry of RMS, self-reported AM, and ACT
composite scores on Step 1 did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(3, 75) = 1.13,
p > .10. However, entry of the RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2
led to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 74) = 9.35, p < .01. Therefore, RMS and selfreported AM interacted to explain a significant amount of variance in persistence (i.e.,
11%) above and beyond the variance explained by their main effects as well as the
main effect of cognitive ability.
Using these MHMR results, I graphed the relationship between RMS and
persistence at high and low levels of self-reported AM (i.e., using one standard
deviation above and below the mean of the self-report scores) without and with
controlling for cognitive ability. This graphing procedure followed that recommended
by both Aiken and West (1991) and Cohen and Cohen (1983), and it was used to
determine if the observed interaction pattern resembled the one predicted by the
integrative model for effort when withdrawal was not feasible (see lower graph of
Figure 5). Additionally, by graphing the results first without and then with controlling
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for cognitive ability, a determination could be made as to whether or not controlling
for cognitive ability weakened the incremental validity of the integrative model.
The resulting graphic representations produced from the regression analyses
conducted without and with cognitive ability controlled for are presented the upper and
lower graphs of Figure 6, respectively. Notice that the two graphs are essentially
identical, indicating that the inclusion of cognitive ability in the MHMR analysis did
not attenuate the validity of the integrative model. In both graphs, persistence
increased as RMS increased only under the condition in which self-reported AM was
high. Conversely, as RMS increased there was a corresponding decrease in
persistence when self-reported AM was low (i.e., under the condition of self-reported
FF). These empirical results displayed in Figure 6 match the theoretical multiplicative
and disordinal interaction depicted in the lower graph of Figure 5, which supports the
earlier hypothesis that Congruent AMs and Congruent FFs would set strong goals in
comparison to the other two prototypes, and thus be more persistent on the cryptoquote
task than the other prototypes.
In order to conduct an objective test on the ability of the integrative model to
remain value-added when controlling for cognitive ability, the statistical significance
of the simple slopes for RMS at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of self-reported
AM was determined without and with ACT composite scores as a covariate. Were the
simple slopes to be statistically significant without ACT composite scores as a
covariate, and then nonsignificant in the presence of ACT, the incremental validity of
the integrative model could be called into question. Table 7 presents the results for
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these tests of the simple slopes. As can be seen from the table, the simple slope for
RMS at a low level of self-reported AM in the prediction of persistence was
nonsignificant without and with ACT controlled. However, the simple slope for RMS
at a high level of self-reported AM in the prediction of persistence was significant (.39,
p < .01), and remained so in the presence of ACT (.43, p < .01). Therefore, the
inclusion of cognitive ability as a covariate did not decrease the incremental validity of
the integrative model in the prediction of persistence.
Intensity on the first cryptoquote puzzle was the next criterion analyzed via
MHMR (see Table 6). The level of intensity devoted to attempting to solve the first
cryptoquote was analyzed because it was the only cryptoquote puzzle which every
participant attempted (i.e., some participants persisted in attempting to solve the first
cryptoquote during the entire test session and thus did not attempt later cryptoquotes).
In the analysis without controlling for cognitive ability, entry of RMS and selfreported AM on Step 1 did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(2, 79) = 1.14, p >
.10. However, entry of the RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 led to
a significant increase in R2, F(1, 78) = 6.84, p < .05. Therefore, RMS and selfreported AM interacted to explain a significant amount of variance in intensity devoted
to attempting to solve the first cryptoquote (i.e., 8%) above and beyond the variance
explained by the main effects. In the analysis in which cognitive ability was controlled
for, entry of RMS, self-reported AM, and ACT composite scores on Step 1 did not
lead to a significant increase in R2, F(3, 75) = 1.07, p > .10. However, entry of the
RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 led to a significant increase in
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R2, F(1, 74) = 6.21, p < .05. Therefore, RMS and self-reported AM interacted to
explain a significant amount of variance in intensity on the first cryptoquote (i.e., 7%)
above and beyond the variance explained by their main effects as well as the main
effect of cognitive ability.
Using these MHMR results, I graphed the relationship between RMS and
intensity on the first cryptoquote at high and low levels of self-reported AM (i.e., using
one standard deviation above and below the mean of the self-report scores) without
and with controlling for cognitive ability. This is the exact same graphing procedure
used for persistence above, and for all of the criteria in all studies (i.e., Studies 1, 2, &
3). The graph was used to determine if the observed interaction pattern resembled the
one predicted by the integrative model for effort when withdrawal was not feasible
(see lower graph of Figure 5). Once again, by graphing the results first without and
then with controlling for cognitive ability, a determination could be made as to
whether or not controlling for cognitive ability weakened the incremental validity of
the integrative model.
The resulting graphic representations produced from the regression analyses
conducted without and with cognitive ability controlled for are presented the upper and
lower graphs of Figure 7, respectively. Notice that the two graphs are essentially
identical, indicating that the inclusion of cognitive ability in the MHMR analysis did
not attenuate the validity of the integrative model. In both graphs, intensity on the first
cryptoquote increased as RMS increased only under the condition in which selfreported AM was high. Conversely, as RMS increased there was a corresponding
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decrease in intensity on the first cryptoquote when self-reported AM was low (i.e.,
under the condition of self-reported FF). These empirical results displayed in Figure 7
also match the theoretical multiplicative and disordinal interaction depicted in the
lower graph of Figure 5, which supports the earlier hypothesis that Congruent AMs
and Congruent FFs would set strong goals in comparison to the other two prototypes,
and thus devote greater intensity to the first cryptoquote than the other prototypes.
Therefore, it should be noted that Congruent FFs did not discount the experimental
task by simply remaining on the first cryptoquote without attempting a solution, and
instead clearly persisted in attempting to solve the cryptoquotes, and certainly devoted
a high level of intensity of effort to the first cryptoquote.
Once again, in order to conduct an objective test on the ability of the
integrative model to remain value-added when controlling for cognitive ability, the
statistical significance of the simple slopes for RMS at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD)
levels of self-reported AM was determined without and with ACT composite scores as
a covariate. As discussed earlier, were the simple slopes to be statistically significant
without ACT composite scores as a covariate, and then nonsignificant in the presence
of ACT, the incremental validity of the integrative model could be called into
question. As can be seen in Table 7, the simple slope for RMS at a low level of selfreported AM in the prediction of intensity on the first cryptoquote was nonsignificant
without and with ACT controlled. However, the simple slope for RMS at a high level
of self-reported AM in the prediction of intensity on the first cryptoquote was
significant (.41, p < .01), and remained so in the presence of ACT (.36, p < .05).
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Therefore, the inclusion of cognitive ability as a covariate did not attenuate the
incremental validity of the integrative model in the prediction of intensity on the first
cryptoquote.
Total intensity was also analyzed to provide confirmation of the assertions
made on the basis of the results for intensity devoted to the first cryptoquote.
Furthermore, were some prototypes to choose a strategy of devoting high levels of
intensity to multiple cryptoquotes, then this criterion would reveal such a strategy in
comparison to the other Study 1a criteria. Thus, total intensity was also analyzed via
MHMR in the same fashion as above (see Table 6). In the analysis without controlling
for cognitive ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1 did not lead to a
significant increase in R2, F(2, 79) = 0.32, p > .10. However, entry of the RMS by
self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 led to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 78)
= 3.49, p < .10. Therefore, RMS and self-reported AM interacted to explain a
significant amount of variance in total intensity devoted to attempting to solve the
cryptoquotes (i.e., 4%) above and beyond the variance explained by the main effects.
In the analysis in which cognitive ability was controlled for, entry of RMS, selfreported AM, and ACT composite scores on Step 1 led to a significant increase in R2,
F(3, 75) = 2.29, p < .10. Additionally, entry of the RMS by self-reported AM
interaction term on Step 2 led to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 74) = 3.09, p < .10.
Therefore, RMS and self-reported AM interacted to explain a significant amount of
variance in total intensity devoted to solving the cryptoquotes (i.e., 4%) above and
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beyond the variance explained by their main effects as well as the main effect of
cognitive ability.
Using these MHMR results, the relationship between RMS and total intensity
was graphed at high and low levels of self-reported AM without and with controlling
for cognitive ability. The resulting graphic representations produced from the
regression analyses conducted without and with cognitive ability controlled for are
presented the upper and lower graphs of Figure 8, respectively. Notice that the two
graphs are almost identical, indicating that the inclusion of cognitive ability in the
MHMR analysis most likely did not attenuate the validity of the integrative model. In
both graphs, total intensity increased as RMS increased only under the condition in
which self-reported AM was high. Conversely, as RMS increased there was a
corresponding decrease in total intensity when self-reported AM was low. These
empirical results displayed in Figure 8 match the theoretical multiplicative and
disordinal interaction depicted in the lower graph of Figure 5, which supports the
earlier hypothesis that Congruent AMs and Congruent FFs would set strong goals in
comparison to the other two prototypes, and thus devote greater intensity to the
cryptoquote task than the other prototypes. Therefore, once again it should be noted
that Congruent FFs did not discount the experimental task by simply remaining on the
first cryptoquote without attempting a solution, and instead clearly persisted in
attempting to solve the cryptoquotes, and certainly devoted a high level of intensity of
effort to the cryptoquote task.
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Once again, in order to conduct an objective test on the ability of the
integrative model to remain value-added when controlling for cognitive ability, the
statistical significance of the simple slopes for RMS at low (-1 SD) and high (+1 SD)
levels of self-reported AM was determined without and with ACT composite scores as
a covariate. As can be seen in Table 7, the simple slope for RMS at a low level of
self-reported AM in the prediction of intensity on the first cryptoquote was
nonsignificant without and with ACT controlled. Additionally, the simple slope for
RMS at a high level of self-reported AM in the prediction of total intensity was
significant (.25, p < .10), but did not remain so in the presence of ACT (.12, p > .10).
Therefore, the inclusion of cognitive ability as a covariate partially attenuated the
incremental validity of the integrative model in the prediction of total intensity.
However, this attenuation was only partial, as it must be recalled that the pattern of
the disordinal interaction in the prediction of total intensity remained statistically
significant when controlling for cognitive ability as noted in the above analyses of the
change in R2. In other words, although the simple slope for RMS in the prediction of
total intensity when self-reported AM was high dropped from significance to
nonsignificance in the presence of cognitive ability, the pattern of the disordinal
interaction remained significant in the presence of cognitive ability, and continued to
explain 4% of the variance in total intensity. In sum, although the incremental validity
of the integrative model in the prediction of total intensity was slightly attenuated
when controlling for cognitive ability, the model nonetheless obtained incremental
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validity above and beyond all main effects, including that of cognitive ability, when
considering the overall pattern of the interaction.
The fourth criterion examined in Study 1a was effort. Recall that effort
equaled total intensity divided by the number of cryptoquotes attempted. This
criterion served to provide the most comprehensive test of the integrative model with
respect to its ability to predict an overall level of effort, which serves as a primary
dependent variable and construct in the nomological net of achievement motivation
(Cooper, 1983; Feather, 1961). Effort was also analyzed via MHMR in the same
fashion as above (see Table 6). In the analysis without controlling for cognitive
ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1 did not lead to a significant
increase in R2, F(2, 79) = 1.12, p > .10. However, entry of the RMS by self-reported
AM interaction term on Step 2 led to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 78) = 12.22, p <
.01. Therefore, RMS and self-reported AM interacted to explain a significant amount
of variance in effort on the cryptoquote task (i.e., 13%) above and beyond the variance
explained by the main effects. In the analysis in which cognitive ability was controlled
for, entry of RMS, self-reported AM, and ACT composite scores on Step 1 led to a
nonsignificant increase in R2, F(3, 75) = 1.06, p > .10. However, entry of the RMS by
self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 led to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 74)
= 11.85, p < .01. Therefore, RMS and self-reported AM interacted to explain a
significant amount of variance in total intensity devoted to solving the cryptoquotes
(i.e., 13%) above and beyond the variance explained by their main effects as well as
the main effect of cognitive ability.
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Using these MHMR results, the relationship between RMS and effort was
graphed at high and low levels of self-reported AM without and with controlling for
cognitive ability. The resulting graphic representations are presented in Figure 9.
Notice that the two graphs are identical, indicating that the inclusion of cognitive
ability in the MHMR analysis did not decrease the validity of the integrative model. In
both graphs, effort increased as RMS increased only under the condition in which selfreported AM was high. Conversely, as RMS increased there was a corresponding
decrease in effort when self-reported AM was low. These empirical results displayed
in Figure 9 match the theoretical multiplicative and disordinal interaction depicted in
the lower graph of Figure 5, which supports the earlier hypothesis that Congruent AMs
and Congruent FFs would set strong goals in comparison to the other two prototypes,
and thus devote greater amounts of effort to the cryptoquote task than the other
prototypes. Finally, it should be noted once again that Congruent FFs did not dismiss
the experimental task by simply remaining on the first cryptoquote without attempting
a solution, and instead clearly put forth high levels of effort toward the cryptoquote
task.
Once again, the statistical significance of the simple slopes for RMS at low (-1
SD) and high (+1 SD) levels of self-reported AM was determined without and with
ACT composite scores as a covariate. As can be seen in Table 7, the simple slope for
RMS at a low level of self-reported AM in the prediction of effort was nonsignificant
without ACT controlled, but became significant when ACT was controlled (-.28, p <
.10). Additionally, the simple slope for RMS at a high level of self-reported AM in the
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prediction of total intensity was significant (.45, p < .01), and remained so in the
presence of ACT (.40, p < .01). Therefore, the inclusion of cognitive ability as a
covariate did not decrease the incremental validity of the integrative model in the
prediction of the overall level of effort devoted to the cryptoquote task. In sum, the
incremental validity of the integrative model in the prediction of effort above and
beyond all main effects, including that of cognitive ability, was confirmed via these
analyses.
Discussion
The above results for Study 1a provide unambiguous evidence for the
incremental validity of the integrative model above and beyond not only CRT and selfreport when used in isolation, but also above and beyond cognitive ability. Clearly,
the multidimensional view of achievement motivation and fear-of-failure provided by
the integrative model serves to enhance our understanding of why persons put forth
different levels of effort. Specifically, the evidence supports the viewpoint that
Congruent AMs and Congruent FFs set high goals in comparison to the other
prototypes. Congruent AMs are in the habit of setting strong mastery goals when
faced with challenging tasks (Dweck & Leggett, 1988), and thus are more persistent
and put forth more effort than Hesitant AMs and AM Pretenders faced with these
demanding situations. Alternatively, when faced with challenging tasks, and when the
possibility of withdrawal from those tasks is very limited and such withdrawal could
also cause psychological damage (e.g., being labeled a "quitter" by oneself and others
when exiting an experiment prematurely), Congruent FFs tend to set high performance
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goals. As a consequence, they also demonstrated persistence and put forth more effort
on the task than Hesitant AMs and AM Pretenders.
To clarify these results in terms of prototypes, median splits were performed on
RMS and self-reported AM. Specifically, participants who scored above the median
on both measures were labeled as Congruent AMs, those who scored below the
median on both measures were labeled as Congruent FFs, those who scored above the
median on RMS and below the median on the self-report were labeled Hesitant AMs,
and those who scored below the median on RMS and above the median on the selfreport were labeled as AM Pretenders. Figure 10 displays the pattern of persistence on
the cryptoquote task for each of these four prototypes. For each of these prototypes,
the percentage of participants reaching each cryptoquote puzzle is shown. The eighth
cryptoquote is actually the last page of the test session, and does not contain a
cryptoquote puzzle. However, if participants reached this page of the cryptoquote task
it indicated that they did not persist in attempting to solve the seventh puzzle as well as
the preceding puzzles.
Figure 10 illustrates that none of (i.e., 0%) of the Congruent FFs, Hesitant
AMs, and AM Pretenders persisted in attempting to solve the first puzzle, and thus all
of them reached the second puzzle. In contrast, approximately 15% of Congruent AMs
persisted in attempting to solve the first puzzle, and thus did not reach the second
puzzle. This illustration provides some evidence that Congruent AMs were more
persistent than all other prototypes. Also important, but not quite as interesting, is the
fact that 20% of the Hesitant AMs and 10% of the AM Pretenders reached the eighth
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page of the cryptoquote task, and thus did not persist in attempting to solve any of the
cryptoquote puzzles.5 Alternatively, approximately 5% of both Congruent AMs and
Congruent FFs reached the sixth cryptoquote puzzle, and thus the other 95% of both
congruent prototypes persisted in attempting to solve the fifth puzzle or a preceding
puzzle before the test session ended.
Further clarification is provided by Figure 11, in which the results for the mean
level of intensity devoted to attempting solve the cryptoquotes is displayed for each
prototype. Note that if a participant did not reach a particular cryptoquote then an
attempt was not made to solve that cryptoquote by the participant, and that
participant's data was not used to calculate the mean level of intensity for that
particular cryptoquote. However, if a participant reached a particular cryptoquote but
did not utilize any part of the workspace in attempting a solution for that cryptoquote,
then that participant received a zero intensity score on that cryptoquote. Also, recall
that 100% of every prototype attempted the first puzzle, and 100% of all prototypes
except Congruent AMs attempted the second puzzle. Consequently, the mean level of
intensity results for the first puzzle displayed in Figure 11 are based on the entire
sample, whereas the results for the second puzzle lack 15% of the Congruent AMs,
and so forth. As can be seen in Figure 11, on the average, Congruent AMs reached a
much higher level of intensity than all other prototypes when attempting to solve the
first puzzle. It is also interesting to note that once Congruent FFs quit attempting to

5

The eighth page of the cryptoquote task did not contain a cryptoquote puzzle, and simply instructed the
participants to check the box in the upper right-hand corner of the eight page, and to stop and wait for
further instructions from the experimenter.
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solve the first cryptoquote and attempted the second, they reached a comparable
average level of intensity as Congruent AMs in attempting to solve the second
cryptoquote. Finally, an examination of the average level of intensity devoted to
solving the last cryptoquote indicates that all prototypes save the Congruent AM
prototype essentially ceased in their attempts to solve the puzzle. Figure 12 illustrates
the mean level of effort expended on the cryptoquote task by the four prototypes. As
the figure shows, Congruent AMs appeared to dedicate more effort to the cryptoquote
task than all other prototypes. It would also appear that Congruent FFs devoted more
effort than the incongruent prototypes (i.e., Hesitant AMs and AM Pretenders).
These results, in combination with the MHMR findings, support the earlier
assertions made regarding the four prototypes of the integrative model with respect to
the prediction of persistence, intensity, and effort. Further, the integrative model
clearly demonstrated incremental validity in the explanation of persistence, intensity,
and effort above and beyond that explained by implicit (i.e., RMS) and explicit (i.e.,
self-reported) achievement-related cognitions when used in isolation, as well as
beyond that explained by cognitive ability. In order to test the earlier assertions made
regarding the four prototypes of the integrative model with respect to the prediction of
performance Study 1b was conducted.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 1B
Study 1b tested the integrative model by measuring performance on
increasingly difficult math problems. Study 1b utilized the same student participants
who completed the cryptoquote task in Study 1a. However, for this task the
integrative model was expected to generate an additive pattern in the prediction of
math performance. Specifically, because Congruent AMs tend to put forth high levels
of effort when faced with challenging tasks and subsequently acquire the requisite
skills for obtaining high levels of performance, they were predicted to reach higher
levels of performance on the math test than the other three prototypes. As Congruent
FFs tend to avoid challenge, they typically do not acquire the skills necessary for
obtaining high levels of performance, and thus they were predicted to attain lower
levels of performance on the math test than the other three prototypes. This predicted
additive pattern is displayed in the upper graph of Figure 5.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of the same 110 undergraduate students attending the
database management course in Study 1a. The students participated in the study for
the purpose of earning extra credit applicable to their course grade.
Predictor Measures
The same scores for RMS, self-perceived achievement motivation, and
cognitive ability that were obtained in Study 1a served as predictors in Study 1b.
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Criterion Measure
In this study, performance on increasingly difficult math problems was
assessed. Each math problem was selected from the quantitative section of a Graduate
Record Examination (GRE) by dividing the section, which contained a total of 20
problems, into 5 sets with 4 items each. The quantitative section was divided into five
sets as follows: set 1 contained problems 1 through 4, set 2 contained problems 5
through 8, set 3 contained problems 9 through 12, set 4 contained problems 13 through
16, and set 5 contained problems 17 through 20. One math problem was chosen from
each set, and the participants were presented with the problems in the same order as
they appeared in the sets. Specifically, the problem from the first set was the first
problem on the test; the problem from the second set was the second problem on the
test, and so forth. Finally, each math problem appeared in its original multiple-choice
format and was scored by assigning +1 for a correct answer and 0 for an incorrect
answer. Scored items were summed to create a composite score that was labeled
“math total performance,” with higher scores representing higher levels of
performance. Using coefficient alpha, an internal consistency reliability estimate of
.40 was obtained for this performance measure.
Procedure
As stated above in Study 1a, the math test was administered after the CRT, and
took approximately 20 minutes to complete. Once each participant had completed the
CRT, the participants were instructed that they would be taking a brief math test. The
instructions were read aloud and encouraged the participants to attempt to solve each
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problem to the best of their ability. The majority of the participants took
approximately 10 to 15 minutes to finish the test, and at the end of 20 minutes the
participants were required to stop working, and proceeded to the cryptoquote task at
the experimenter's direction.
Results
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of the Study 1b variables.
The mean math total performance was 3.65 (SD = 1.08). Table 5 presents the
intercorrelations of the Study 1b variables. As can be seen from the table, RMS was
significantly correlated with math total performance (r = .19, p < .05). The self-report
of AM did not correlate significantly with math total performance. ACT composite
correlated significantly with math total performance (r = .38, p < .01).
Central to Study 1b, as well as every study which investigated performance as
the criterion, was the hypothesis that the integrative model would predict variance in
performance beyond that predicted by RMS and self-reported AM when used in
isolation. Specifically, Congruent AMs were predicted to have acquired more
performance-relevant skills than the other three prototypes due to the tendency of
Congruent AMs to approach challenging tasks. In contrast, Congruent FFs were
predicted to have acquired fewer performance-relevant skills than the other three
prototypes due to the tendency of Congruent FFs to avoid challenging tasks. Thus, the
additive pattern depicted in the upper graph of Figure 5 was predicted to emerge with
performance criteria. Specifically, both RMS and self-reported AM were predicted to
have significant main effects in the prediction of performance, and to contribute to the
62

explanation of performance above and beyond their isolated effects. As before,
because cognitive ability is known to be a powerful predictor of achievement-related
behaviors (e.g., Schippmann & Prien, 1989; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), it was
controlled for statistically to determine the incremental validity of the integrative
model.
As in Study 1a, I utilized the MHMR procedure to test the predictions of the
integrative model with respect to math total performance (see Table 6). In the analysis
without controlling for cognitive ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1
did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(2, 79) = 1.30, p > .10. Further, entry of
the RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant
increase in R2, F(1, 78) = 0.85, p > .10. Therefore, the additive model for RMS and
self-reported AM was not supported in this analysis. In the subsequent analysis that
controlled for cognitive ability, entry of RMS, self-reported AM, and ACT composite
scores on Step 1 led to a significant increase in R2, F(3, 75) = 7.98, p < .01. Entry of
the RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant
increase in R2, F(1, 74) = 1.15, p > .10. An examination of the beta weights in Step 1
of this analysis revealed that neither RMS nor self-reported AM served as a significant
predictor of math total performance in the presence of ACT composite scores.
Therefore, once again the additive pattern hypothesized for the integrative model in the
prediction of performance was not supported.
Nonetheless, the relationship between RMS and math total performance was
graphed at high and low levels of self-reported AM without and with controlling for
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cognitive ability. The resulting graphic representations produced from the regression
analyses are presented in Figure 13. Notice that although an additive pattern was
predicted, the two graphs are more suggestive of an interaction between RMS and selfreported AM, albeit nonsignificant. In both graphs, math total performance appeared
to increase as RMS increased only under the condition in which self-reported AM was
high. Conversely, there did not appear to be a relationship between RMS and math
total performance when self-reported AM was low.
In order to examine these results further, the statistical significance of the
simple slopes for RMS at low and high levels of self-reported AM was determined
without and with ACT composite scores as a covariate. As can be seen in Table 7, the
simple slope for RMS at a low level of self-reported AM in the prediction of math
total performance was nonsignificant without and with ACT controlled. However, the
simple slope for RMS at a high level of self-reported AM in the prediction of math
total performance was at first significant (.28, p < .05), but did not remain so in the
presence of ACT (.15, p > .10).
Clearly, these results did not support the a priori theoretical predictions of the
integrative model with respect to performance criteria. However, subjective
examination of Figure 13 suggested the possibility that Congruent AMs performed at a
higher level than all other prototypes. This possibility was borne out in part by the
significant simple slope found for RMS under the condition of a high level of selfreported AM without controlling for cognitive ability. As noted earlier, although the
MHMR procedure is usually a more powerful detector of interactions between
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continuous predictors in comparison to the artificial categorization of those predictors
and subsequent ANOVA or subgroup-based correlation coefficient procedures (Cohen,
1983; Stone-Romero & Anderson, 1994), there are those who have noted that this is
not always the case (e.g., see McClelland & Judd, 1993). In order to explore the
possibility that a subgrouping procedure and a subsequent general linear model (GLM)
analysis would reveal this potential interaction, the aforementioned median splits were
utilized. The main effects and the interaction of these dichotomous representations of
RMS and self-reported AM were tested without and with ACT as a covariate in a
GLM analysis. In the GLM analysis without ACT as a covariate the means and
standard deviations for the four prototypes were as follows: for Congruent AMs, 4.13
(SD = 0.92); for Congruent FFs, 3.70 (SD = 1.14); for Hesitant AMs, 3.37 (SD = 1.07);
and for AM Pretenders, 3.21 (SD = 0.98). Additionally, there were no significant main
effects, but there was a significant interaction, F(1, 84) = 7.93, p < .01.
In the GLM analysis with ACT as a covariate the means and standard
deviations for the four prototypes were as follows: for Congruent AMs, 4.19 (SD =
0.81); for Congruent FFs, 3.70 (SD = 1.14); for Hesitant AMs, 3.35 (SD = 1.11); and
for AM Pretenders, 3.21 (SD = 0.98). Additionally, there were no significant main
effects, but once again there was a significant interaction, F(1, 79) = 4.74, p < .05, and
this time it occurred when controlling for cognitive ability.
Discussion
These exploratory results support the possibility that a multiplicative and
disordinal interaction occurred in the prediction of math total performance, even when
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controlling for cognitive ability. It should be emphasized that this interaction was not
predicted, and is contrary to the a priori additive prediction of the integrative model
for performance criteria.
Figure 14 clarifies these results by displaying the percentage of each of the four
prototypes correctly answering each of the five math problems. This figure certainly
supports the interpretation that Congruent AMs reach higher levels of performance
than the other prototypes. By extension, Figure 14 supports the interpretation that
Congruent AMs have acquired more performance-based skills than the other
prototypes, most likely as a result of the tendency of Congruent AMs to approach
challenging tasks relative to the other prototypes. However, it would appear from the
figure that Congruent FFs outperformed the incongruent prototypes (i.e., Hesitant AMs
and AM Pretenders), especially on the last and most difficult math problem. It is
possible that with this math test, as with the cryptoquote task, Congruent FFs set
strong performance goals in order to avoid the aversive psychological states that would
follow from failure.
Consequently, as in Study 1a, here in Study 1b a significant disordinal
interaction was obtained in the prediction of the dependent variable, in this case total
math performance, if the results of the GLM analyses are to be trusted. Specifically,
although subgrouping procedures utilized for GLM analyses are typically criticized for
lacking statistical power and thus incapable of detecting true interactions (see StoneRomero & Anderson, 1994, for increases in Type II errors from subgrouping
procedures), the subgrouping procedures may also lead to spurious significance when
66

interactions, in truth, do not exist (see Maxwell & Delaney, 1993, for increases in
Type I errors from subgrouping procedures). Indeed, MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher,
and Rucker (2002) recently demonstrated that spurious statistical significance and
overestimation of effect size are likely to occur in the current particular case, in which
two predictors have been artificially dichotomized via median splits and subjected to
ANOVA or GLM analyses. In sum, because these analyses were exploratory, and
because they utilize an error-prone subgrouping procedure, the above conclusions for
Study 1b must be considered tenuous, although they are somewhat consistent with the
findings of Study 1a, which utilized the same research participants.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 1C
Study 1c tested the integrative model by measuring performance under
considerably less time pressure than in either Study 1a or 1b. Specifically, Study 1c
assessed academic performance in terms of final course grade and cumulative GPA.
Once again, Study 1c utilized the same students who participated in the previous
studies (i.e., in Studies 1a & 1b). Additionally, like in Study 1b, in the current study
the integrative model was expected to generate an additive pattern in the prediction of
academic performance for the same reasons that an additive pattern was expected in
the prediction of math performance. Specifically, Congruent AMs were predicted to
reach higher levels of academic performance than the other three prototypes, and
Congruent FFs were predicted to attain lower levels of academic performance than the
other three prototypes. This additive pattern is displayed in the upper graph of Figure
5.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of the same 110 undergraduate students attending the
database management course in Study 1a.
Predictor Measures
The same scores for RMS, self-perceived achievement motivation, and
cognitive ability that were obtained in Studies 1a and 1b served as predictors in Study
1c.
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Criterion Measures
In this study, academic performance was assessed in terms of final course
grade for the introductory database management class as well as cumulative GPA.
Procedure
As stated above, the participants completed the RMS and self-report predictor
measures at one of the sessions held earlier in the semester. Final course grades,
cumulative GPAs, ACT scores, and SAT scores were obtained from the university’s
registrar at the end of the semester with the permission of the participants.
Results
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of the Study 1c variables.
The mean course grade was 84.67 (SD = 7.74), and mean overall GPA was 3.23 (SD =
0.54). Table 5 presents the intercorrelations of the Study 1c variables. As can be seen
from the table, RMS was significantly correlated with both course grade (r = .27, p <
.01) and overall GPA (r = .22, p < .05). The self-report of AM correlated significantly
with course grade (r = .20, p < .05), but did not correlate significantly with overall
GPA. ACT composite scores correlated significantly with both course grade (r = .33,
p < .01) and overall GPA (r = .48, p < .01).
Central to Study 1c was the hypothesis that the integrative model would predict
variance in school performance beyond that predicted by RMS and self-reported AM
when used in isolation. Specifically, Congruent AMs were predicted reach the highest
levels of school performance, and Congruent FFs were predicted to reach the lowest
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levels for the same reasons mentioned in Study 1b. Once again, the additive pattern
depicted in the upper graph of Figure 5 was predicted to emerge.
The MHMR procedure was utilized as before to test the predictions of the
integrative model with respect to course grade (see Table 6). In the analysis without
controlling for cognitive ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1 led to a
significant increase in R2, F(2, 79) = 4.90, p < .01. However, entry of the RMS by
self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2,
F(1, 78) = 0.06, p > .10. Therefore, the additive model for RMS and self-reported AM
was supported in this analysis, and accounted for 11% of the variance in course grade.
In the subsequent analysis that controlled for cognitive ability, entry of RMS, selfreported AM, and ACT composite scores on Step 1 led to a significant increase in R2,
F(3, 75) = 5.32, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on
Step 2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 74) = 0.47, p > .10. An
examination of the beta weights in Step 1 of this analysis revealed that RMS did not
remain a significant predictor of course grade in the presence of ACT composite
scores. However, self-reported AM remained a significant predictor of course grade.
Therefore, although the additive pattern hypothesized for the integrative model in the
prediction of performance (i.e., course grade) was supported in the first analysis, the
incremental validity of the integrative model attenuated in the presence of cognitive
ability.
The relationship between RMS and course grade was graphed at high and low
levels of self-reported AM without and with controlling for cognitive ability. The
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resulting graphic representations produced from the regression analyses are presented
in Figure 15. Notice that the empirical results displayed in the upper graph of Figure
15 match the additive pattern predicted, and thus provide empirical support for the
integrative model in the prediction of performance. Additionally, although the
empirical results shown when controlling for cognitive ability in the lower graph of
Figure 15 are similar to those shown in the upper graph, they are not identical.
Specifically, the difference between Congruent AMs and Hesitant AMs on course
grade is lessened when controlling for cognitive ability. Nonetheless, the relation
between RMS and course grade, which was significant and positive in the first MHMR
analysis, clearly remained positive, albeit nonsignificant, at low and high levels of selfreported AM in the presence of cognitive ability (i.e., in the second MHMR analysis).
To clarify these results, tests of the significance of the simple slopes were
pursued. The statistical significance of the simple slopes for RMS at low and high
levels of self-reported AM was determined without and with ACT composite scores as
a covariate. As can be seen in Table 7, the simple slope for RMS at a low level of
self-reported AM in the prediction of course grade was significant without (.26, p <
.10), but not with ACT controlled. The simple slope for RMS at a high level of selfreported AM in the prediction of course grade was nonsignificant, and remained so in
the presence of ACT. Clearly, these results provided only partial support for the a
priori theoretical predictions of the integrative model with respect to performance
criteria.
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The MHMR procedure was also utilized to test the integrative model with
respect to overall GPA (see Table 6). In the analysis without controlling for cognitive
ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1 did not lead to a significant
increase in R2, F(2, 79) = 2.34, p > .10. Additionally, entry of the RMS by selfreported AM interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2,
F(1, 78) = 0.07, p > .10. Therefore, the additive model for RMS and self-reported AM
was not supported in this analysis. In the subsequent analysis that controlled for
cognitive ability, entry of RMS, self-reported AM, and ACT composite scores on Step
1 led to a significant increase in R2, F(3, 75) = 7.98, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by
self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2,
F(1, 74) = 1.15, p > .10. Both sets of analyses in this case failed to support the
integrative model (see Figure 16 for graphic representations of the results), and in this
case the tests of simple slopes did not reveal any significant findings (see Table 7).
Discussion
Clearly, the results for course grade provided some, although not much support
for the a priori additive predictions of the integrative model, and the results for overall
GPA provided no support. Study 2 was performed as a replication of Study 1c, using a
much larger sample to increase statistical power. Thus, Study 2 might allow for the
detection of the ability of the integrative model to be value-added in the prediction of
school performance, in particular above and beyond cognitive ability as this covariate
clearly absorbed significant amounts of joint variance in the performance criteria,
whereas its prediction of the effort criteria was not as powerful.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 2
Study 2 was conducted as a replication of Study 1c. Two semesters after Study
1c was conducted, students were once again recruited from the introductory database
management course. Thus, in Study 2, the predictor and criterion measures were
collected on a different sample of students taking the same course. As in Study 1c,
here in Study 2 the integrative model was expected to obtain an additive pattern in the
prediction of academic performance.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 300 undergraduate students attending the same
introductory database management course utilized in Study 1c.6 As mentioned above,
the students in Study 2 took the course a year after the students who participated in the
first study. These students also participated in the research for the purpose of earning
extra credit, and with their permission ACT scores, SAT scores, final course grades
and cumulative GPAs were obtained from the university’s registrar at the end of the
semester. The sample was approximately 44% female, and had a mean age of 20.84
years (SD = 3.01).
Predictor Measures
Relative Motive Strength (RMS). The paper-and-pencil conditional reasoning
test (CRT) of achievement motivation (AM) and fear-of-failure (FF) was used to
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measure RMS, and at no time did the participants give any indication that they
believed the test to be assessing anything other than reasoning skills. Once again,
CRT item responses were scored and summed to create RMS composite scores and
higher RMS scores indicated stronger orientations toward achievement motivation. In
the current study, the Kuder-Richardson (Formula 20) coefficient based on the average
of the item-total polyserial correlations obtained an internal consistency reliability
estimate of .60 for the RMS composite scores.
Self-Report of Achievement Motivation. In this study the eight-item self-report
scale of achievement striving from the Conscientiousness factor of the NEO
Personality Inventory-Revised (NEO-PI-R; Costa & McCrae, 1992) was used to
measure self-perceived achievement motivation. This instrument was chosen in place
of the semantic differential scale used in the first study because the achievement
striving facet of the NEO-PI-R has prior evidence of reliability and validity with
respect to school performance (e.g., see Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, & Powell, 1995).
Additionally, this achievement striving scale was chosen for the pragmatic reason that
its response format (i.e., a 5-point Likert scale) was compatible with the other items of
the omnibus survey that was administered to the study participants. An example item
from this scale is “I strive for excellence in everything I do.” The participants were
instructed to indicate the extent to which they agreed with each item using a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from (1) strongly disagree to (5) strongly agree. Items were coded
and summed such that higher composite scale scores represented higher levels of self6

It should be noted that of the 300 participants in Study 2, 248 (82.67%) completed both the CRT and
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perceived achievement motivation. An internal consistency reliability estimate of .79
was obtained via coefficient alpha for this measure.
Cognitive Ability. ACT and SAT scores were collected from the university’s
registrar in order to control for individual differences in cognitive ability, and to
determine the capacity of the integrative model to predict variance in performance
above and beyond cognitive ability. When only the SAT score was available for a
participant that score was converted to an equivalent ACT score via conversion tables
(Schneider & Dorans, 1999).
Criterion Measures
Academic performance was assessed in the same fashion as before by
obtaining final course grades for the introductory database management class and
cumulative GPAs.
Procedure
The opportunity to earn extra credit was announced in class. The participants
were told that they could attend one of several identical research sessions that would
be offered, and that each session would last approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes.
Several instruments were administered at each session, and the order of administration
as well as the nature of the instruments did not vary across the sessions.
Informed consent forms were completed at the beginning of each session. The
CRT was the first instrument administered at each session, followed by an omnibus
survey that contained the self-report of achievement striving. With the consent of the

the self-report of achievement motivation.
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participants, course grades, cumulative GPAs, ACT scores, and SAT scores were
obtained from the university’s registrar at the end of the semester.7
Results
Table 8 presents the means and standard deviations of the Study 2 variables.
The mean RMS composite score was 2.63 (SD = 4.05), and the mean self-report of
achievement motivation (i.e., achievement striving) was 28.37 (SD = 4.73). The mean
ACT composite score was 23.60 (SD = 3.70). The mean course grade was 79.17 (SD
= 14.37), and the mean overall GPA was 3.01 (SD = 0.57).
Table 9 presents the intercorrelations of the Study 2 variables. As can be seen
from the table, RMS did not correlate significantly with self-reported AM (r = .01, p >
.10). Once again, as in Study 1, this nonsignificant correlation supports the earlier
assertion that the CRT serves as a measure of generally unrecognized implicit
achievement motives that are often not significantly related to self-attributed (i.e., selfreported), explicit achievement motives. Further, RMS correlated significantly with
ACT composite scores (r = .30, p < .01), whereas self-reported AM did not (r = .02, p
> .10).
RMS obtained significant correlations with course grade (r = .09, p < .10) and
overall GPA (r = .21, p < .01). The self-report of achievement motivation also
obtained significant correlations with course grade (r = .27, p < .01) and overall GPA

7

The Study 2 data were part of a larger validation study for the conditional reasoning test of AM and
FF. Once again, although I pursued the theoretical development of the integrative model and its
predictions and results independently, the data were gathered in cooperation with another graduate
student in Dr. Lawrence R. James’ research laboratory. This graduate student of Dr. Lawrence R. James
(i.e., LeBreton) conducted another study on the same sample of research participants.
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(r = .21, p < .01). ACT composite correlated significantly with course grade (r = .37,
p < .01) and overall GPA (r = .48, p < .01).
As in Study 1c, here in Study 2 Congruent AMs were predicted reach the
highest levels of school performance, and Congruent FFs were predicted to reach the
lowest levels for the same reasons mentioned above. Once again, the additive pattern
displayed in the upper graph of Figure 5 was predicted to emerge.
The MHMR procedure was utilized as before to test the predictions of the
integrative model with respect to course grade (see Table 10). In the analysis without
controlling for cognitive ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1 led to a
significant increase in R2, F(2, 236) = 14.30, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by selfreported AM interaction term on Step 2 also led to a significant increase in R2, F(1,
235) = 4.00, p < .05. Therefore, as with math total performance, the results were not
identical to the additive pattern predicted. However, the interaction explained 2% of
the variance in course grade above and beyond the main effects, and the overall R2 was
.12 (i.e., 12% of the variance in course grade was explained via the main effects and
interaction combined).
In the MHMR analysis that controlled for cognitive ability, entry of RMS, selfreported AM, and ACT composite scores on Step 1 led to a significant increase in R2,
F(3, 206) = 26.27, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on
Step 2 once again led to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 205) = 3.16, p < .10.
Although the additive pattern hypothesized for the integrative model in the prediction
of course grade was not supported in these analyses, the incremental validity of the
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integrative model was demonstrated in the sense that a significant interaction between
RMS and self-reported AM was obtained when controlling for cognitive ability. In
order to examine the nature of this interaction, the relationship between RMS and
course grade was graphed at high and low levels of self-reported AM without and with
controlling for cognitive ability. The resulting graphic representations produced from
the regression analyses are presented in Figure 17.
Notice that the empirical results displayed in both the upper and lower graphs
of Figure 17 are not entirely inconsistent with the predictions of the integrative model
made with respect to performance. Specifically, the interaction was not disordinal,
and thus in both cases (i.e., without and with ACT) Congruent AMs obtained higher
course grades than Congruent FFs and Hesitant AMs. Additionally, Congruent FFs
obtained lower course grades than AM Pretenders without and with controlling for
cognitive ability. These rank orders on course grade are consistent with the rank
orders predicted by the a priori additive pattern of the integrative model when used to
explain differences in performance. The surprising result came in the comparison of
course grades for AM Pretenders and Congruent AMs when controlling for cognitive
ability. In this case, the level of course grades for these two prototypes were nearly
identical.
In order to more clearly understand these results, tests of the significance of the
simple slopes were pursued. The statistical significance of the simple slopes for RMS
at low and high levels of self-reported AM was determined without and with ACT
composite scores as a covariate. As can be seen in Table 11, the simple slope for RMS
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at a low level of self-reported AM in the prediction of course grade was nonsignificant
without but significant with ACT controlled (-.09, p < .05). The simple slope for RMS
at a high level of self-reported AM in the prediction of course grade was at first
significant (.13, p < .01), but dropped to nonsignificance in the presence of ACT.
Clearly, these results provided partial support for the theoretical predictions of the
integrative model with respect to performance criteria.
The MHMR procedure was also utilized to test the integrative model with
respect to overall GPA (see Table 10). In the analysis without controlling for
cognitive ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1 led to a significant
increase in R2, F(2, 236) = 13.47, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by self-reported AM
interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 235) = 0.73,
p > .10. Therefore, the additive model for RMS and self-reported AM was supported
in this analysis. In the subsequent analysis that controlled for cognitive ability, entry
of RMS, self-reported AM, and ACT composite scores on Step 1 led to a significant
increase in R2, F(3, 206) = 34.47, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by self-reported AM
interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 205) = 0.11,
p > .10. Both sets of analyses in this case provided some support for the integrative
model.
The resulting graphic representations produced from the regression analyses for
overall GPA are presented in Figure 18. Notice once again that the empirical results
displayed in both the upper and lower graphs of Figure 18 are consistent with the
predictions of the integrative model made with respect to performance. Specifically,
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there was no interaction, and in both cases (i.e., without and with ACT) Congruent
AMs obtained higher overall GPAs than Congruent FFs and Hesitant AMs.
Additionally, Congruent FFs obtained lower overall GPAs than AM Pretenders
without and with controlling for cognitive ability. These rank orders on overall GPA
are consistent with the rank orders predicted by the a priori additive pattern of the
integrative model. Once again, the surprising result came in the comparison of overall
GPAs for AM Pretenders and Congruent AMs when controlling for cognitive ability.
In this case, the level of overall GPAs for these two prototypes were nearly identical.
Once again, tests of the significance of the simple slopes were conducted. The
statistical significance of the simple slopes for RMS at low and high levels of selfreported AM was determined without and with ACT composite scores as a covariate.
As can be seen in Table 11, the simple slope for RMS at a low level of self-reported
AM in the prediction of overall GPA was significant (.14, p < .10) without controlling
for cognitive ability, but nonsignificant when controlling for cognitive ability. The
simple slope for RMS at a high level of self-reported AM in the prediction of overall
GPA was at first significant (.24, p < .01), but dropped to nonsignificance in the
presence of ACT. As before, these results provided partial support for the theoretical
predictions of the integrative model with respect to the rank orders of prototypes
hypothesized for performance criteria.
Discussion
Clearly, these results provide some support for the ability of the integrative
model to predict variance in performance above and beyond cognitive ability.
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Congruent AMs obtained higher performance levels than Congruent FFs and Hesitant
AMs on both criteria, and Congruent FFs obtained lower performance levels than AM
Pretenders on both criteria. These rank orders are consistent with the predictions of
the integrative model when used to explain differences in performance.
Moreover, these results are consistent with the assumption that over time
Congruent AMs tend to approach challenging tasks whereas Congruent FFs avoid such
tasks, leading to differences in ability and subsequent differences in performance
between these two prototypes. Additionally, it would appear that there is evidence for
the assumption that Hesitant AMs are more conflicted in their approach of challenging
tasks, which leads them to perform at levels below those of Congruent AMs.
Unexpected findings came in the form of the high level of performance generally
obtained by AM Pretenders in relation to Hesitant AMs.
In 1989, McClelland et al. asserted that implicit motives (measured indirectly
via the TAT) generally sustain repeated behaviors because of the intrinsic pleasure
derived from those behaviors, whereas explicit motives (measured directly via selfreport) are “allied to explicit goals that are normative for a particular group and that
channel the expression of implicit motives for members of that group (pp. 692-693).”
This assertion serves to explain the current results of the above test of the integrative
model. Clearly, AM Pretenders may tend to outperform Hesitant AMs due to the
social rewards that follow from higher levels of school performance (e.g., better jobs
and more money, see Roth & Bobko, 2000). Thus, the self-attributed (i.e., selfreported) explicit motive to achieve of AM Pretenders may drive them to excel in
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comparison to Hesitant AMs, whose self-attributed motive to achieve is certainly
weaker. In this sense, the current findings support McClelland et al.’s (1989)
assertion.
It is also interesting to note that from these results one can infer that Hesitant
AMs are conflicted in their approach of achievement-related activities that are clearly
linked to social incentives, but may instead be pursuing nonacademic activities from
which they derive intrinsic rewards due to their implicit motive to achieve. This
pursuit of nonacademic activities by Hesitant AMs would also help to explain a
reduction in the academic performance of Hesitant AMs in relation to AM Pretenders,
and this speculation should be examined in future studies.
The above speculation regarding the stronger pursuit of social rewards by AM
Pretenders in relation to Hesitant AMs, and subsequent higher levels of performance
of AM Pretenders in relation to Hesitant AMs, was examined in Study 3. Specifically,
the assessment center performance was known by the participants of Study 3 to be
used for decisions about organizational opportunities for leadership training, and thus
increased social status. As a consequence, the finding that AM Pretenders
outperformed Hesitant AMs might be replicated in the results of Study 3. However, it
should be noted that once again Congruent AMs were predicted to reach the highest
levels of performance, and Congruent FFs were predicted to obtain the lowest levels of
performance. Generally, this would generate the additive pattern displayed in the
upper graph of Figure 5, and thus the additive pattern was still predicted.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 3
Study 3 tested the integrative model by assessing in-basket performance and
overall performance in an assessment center. This study was notable from the
standpoint that it served to test the generalizability of the integrative model to the
prediction of performance in an organizational setting among working adults. Here, as
in the previous studies that used performance as the criterion, an additive pattern was
predicted. Specifically, Congruent AMs were predicted to attain the highest level of
performance while Congruent FFs were predicted to attain the lowest level of
performance.
Method
Participants
Two hundred and sixty-three working adults (31% female) employed at a large
utility company in the southeastern United States participated in the current study.
These employees were competing for the opportunity to become trainees in an
organizational leadership development program. As such, the employees volunteered
to participate in an assessment center, and their performance in this center was used to
select the leadership trainees. Assessment center performance was not used to make
termination or promotion decisions.
Predictor Measures
Relative Motive Strength (RMS). The paper-and-pencil conditional reasoning
test (CRT) of achievement motivation (AM) and fear-of-failure (FF) was used to
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measure RMS. Here, as in the other studies, at no time did the participants give any
indication that they believed the test to be assessing anything other than reasoning
skills. Conditional reasoning test item responses were scored and summed to create
RMS composite scores and higher RMS scores indicated stronger orientations toward
achievement motivation. In the current study, the Kuder-Richardson (Formula 20)
coefficient based on the average of the item-total polyserial correlations obtained an
internal consistency reliability estimate of .62 for the RMS composite scores.
Self-Report of Achievement Motivation. The achievement via independence
(Ai) scale of Form 343 of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI; Gough &
Bradley, 1996) was used as the measure of self-perceived achievement motivation in
the current study. This measure of self-reported achievement motivation was utilized
in place of the 8-item achievement striving facet of the NEO-PI-R because the CPI is
routinely administered as part of the assessment center from which the data were
gathered. The CPI is a self-report questionnaire, and the Ai scale is composed of 32
items. Participants answered these items on a true-false response format, and higher
composite scale scores represented higher levels of self-perceived achievement
motivation. Evidence for the reliability and validity of this scale is provided in the test
manual (Gough & Bradley, 1996). Past research has demonstrated that the Ai scale is
a valid predictor of performance (e.g., see Barnette, 1961; Trites, Kurek, & Cobb,
1967).
Cognitive Ability. The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (WGCTA)
was used as the measure of cognitive ability. The WGCTA is a well-know measure of
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general mental ability and logical reasoning, and evidence for its reliability and
validity is provided in the test manual (Watson & Glaser, 1964, 1980). This measure
was obtained in order to control for individual differences in cognitive ability, and to
determine the capacity of the integrative model to predict variance in performance
above and beyond cognitive ability.
Criterion Measures
In-Basket Exercise. The in-basket exercise was designed as a workplace
simulation to measure performance on various dimensions. The participants were
required to read and then respond appropriately to stimuli typically encountered in the
workplace, such as memos, phone calls, and letters. Critical, job-relevant information
was presented among less important distracter information in the stimuli. In order to
obtain a high score the participants had to identify information in the stimuli relevant
to organizational performance, and subsequently act (i.e., make decisions, delegate
responsibility, plan meetings, return phone calls, etc.) in a manner that would protect
and enhance the organization’s performance. These tasks required the accurate
evaluation of data in the stimuli, and the development and implementation of
appropriate responses. The in-basket exercise assessed a total of six dimensions,
which were as follows: analysis, judgement, initiative, decisiveness,
planning/organizing, and customer orientation. The participants had a total of two
hours to complete the exercise.
Two or more trained assessors scored the in-basket exercise. In-basket
performance ratings were first made independently by each assessor via a behavioral
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checklist. Subsequently, the assessors discussed their ratings to assign a score for each
of the six dimensions. Disagreements between assessors were resolved via consensus,
and if necessary, the assistance of a third assessor. Scores for each dimension had a
possible range of 1 to 5, with higher scores representing higher levels of performance.
The scores were subsequently averaged to create an Overall In-Basket Performance
rating. Using these six dimensions as individual items, an internal consistency
reliability estimate of .90 was obtained via coefficient alpha for this measure.
Assessment Center Consensus. In addition to the in-basket exercise the
assessment center included one-on-one subordinate performance counseling
simulations, a leaderless group discussion, a customer negotiation exercise, and other
workplace role playing scenarios. Each of these exercises is scored in the same
fashion as the in-basket dimensions, and higher scores indicate higher levels of
performance. These exercises are used to assess the following additional dimensions
of work performance: leadership, negotiation, teamwork, confrontation, sensitivity,
innovation, stress tolerance, and oral and written communication. An internal
consistency reliability estimate of .90 was obtained via coefficient alpha for these
exercises. Along with performance on the in-basket exercise, scores from these
simulations are used in a consensus evaluation to generate an Assessment Center
Consensus rating that serves as an indicator of overall performance.
Procedure
The exercises of the assessment center required approximately eight hours for
completion. Participants completed the CRT, CPI, and WGCTA first, and then
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proceeded to the various exercises. During the exercises the participants were rated by
at least two assessors. Assessor consensus meetings were held either shortly after the
participants had completed the relevant exercise or once the participants exited the
center. All of the assessor ratings were made without knowledge of the participants’
scores on the CRT, CPI, and WGCTA, and all consensus decisions were also made
without this knowledge.8
Results
Table 12 presents the means and standard deviations of the Study 3 variables.
The mean RMS composite score was 2.31 (SD = 4.02), and the mean self-report of
achievement motivation (i.e., AM via independence) was 54.85 (SD = 6.08). The
mean Watson-Glaser score was 59.70 (SD = 8.83). The mean overall in-basket
performance was 2.78 (SD = 0.54), and the mean assessment center consensus was
2.86 (SD = 1.06).
Table 13 presents the intercorrelations of the Study 3 variables. As can be seen
from the table, RMS correlated significantly with self-reported AM (r = .31, p < .01).
Although unlike Studies 1 and 2 in that the correlation here between RMS and selfreported AM was significant, their shared variance amount to less than 10% (i.e., r2 =
.096). Thus, although implicit achievement motives can be significantly related to
explicit achievement motives, they are clearly not redundant, and the correlation

8

The Study 3 data were part of a larger validation study for the conditional reasoning test of AM and
FF. Once again, although I pursued the theoretical development of the integrative model and its
predictions and results independently, the data were gathered in cooperation with another graduate
student in Dr. Lawrence R. James’ research laboratory. This graduate student of Dr. Lawrence R. James
(i.e., Migetz) conducted another study on the same sample of research participants (see Migetz, James,
& Ladd, 1999).
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between the two is typically low and often nonsignificant. Further, RMS correlated
significantly with Watson-Glaser (r = .57, p < .01), as did self-reported AM (r = .46, p
< .01).
RMS obtained significant correlations with overall in-basked performance (r =
.39, p < .01) and assessment center consensus (r = .54, p < .01). The self-report of
AM also obtained significant correlations with overall in-basked performance (r = .38,
p < .01) and assessment center consensus (r = .55, p < .01). Watson-Glaser correlated
significantly with overall in-basked performance (r = .51, p < .01) and assessment
center consensus (r = .82, p < .01).
As in Study 2, here in Study 3 Congruent AMs were predicted reach the
highest levels of performance, and Congruent FFs were predicted to reach the lowest
levels for the same reasons mentioned above. Once again, the additive pattern depicted
in the upper graph of Figure 5 was predicted to emerge.
The MHMR procedure was utilized as before to test the predictions of the
integrative model with respect to overall in-basket performance (see Table 14). In the
analysis without controlling for cognitive ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM
on Step 1 led to a significant increase in R2, F(2, 257) = 37.57, p < .01. Entry of the
RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 also led to a significant increase
in R2, F(1, 256) = 3.41, p < .10. Therefore, as with the other performance criteria
examined thus far, the results were not identical to the additive pattern predicted.
However, the interaction explained 1% of the variance in overall in-basket
performance above and beyond the main effects, and the overall R2 was .24, and as
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such 24% of the variance in overall in-basket performance was explained via the main
effects of RMS and self-reported AM together with their interaction.
In the MHMR analysis that controlled for cognitive ability, entry of RMS, selfreported AM, and Watson-Glaser on Step 1 led to a significant increase in R2, F(3,
256) = 35.93, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by self-reported AM interaction term on Step
2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2, F(1, 255) = 1.42, p > .10. Here, with
cognitive ability controlled for, the additive pattern hypothesized for the integrative
model in the prediction of overall in-basked performance was supported, with 30% of
the variance in overall in-basket performances explained via the covariate and study
predictors (i.e., R2 = .30). In order to examine these additive effects, the relationship
between RMS and overall in-basket performance was graphed at high and low levels
of self-reported AM without and with controlling for cognitive ability. The resulting
graphic representations produced from the regression analyses are presented in Figure
19.
Notice that the empirical results displayed in both the upper and lower graphs
of Figure 19 are, in general, consistent with the predictions of the integrative model
made with respect to performance. Specifically, the interaction in the upper graph was
not disordinal, and thus in both cases (i.e., without and with ACT) Congruent AMs
obtained higher overall in-basket performances than Congruent FFs and Hesitant
AMs. Furthermore, in these graphs Congruent AMs also appeared to outperform AM
Pretenders, but as before (i.e., as with school performance in Studies 1c and 2) this
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difference in performance between these two prototypes was reduced when controlling
for cognitive ability.
Importantly, as predicted a priori, Congruent FFs obtained lower overall inbasket performances than all other prototypes. These rank orders on overall in-basket
performance are entirely consistent with the rank orders predicted by the a priori
additive pattern of the integrative model when used to explain differences in
performance. Indeed, when cognitive ability was controlled for, the additive pattern
was obtained in this case.
To clarify these results, tests of the significance of the simple slopes were
pursued. The statistical significance of the simple slopes for RMS at low and high
levels of self-reported AM was determined without and with Watson-Glaser scores as
a covariate. As can be seen in Table 15, the simple slope for RMS at a low level of
self-reported AM in the prediction of overall in-basket performance was significant
without (.39, p < .01) and with (.20, p < .05) Watson-Glaser controlled. The simple
slope for RMS at a high level of self-reported AM in the prediction of overall inbasket was at first significant (.20, p < .05), but dropped to nonsignificance in the
presence of Watson-Glaser. Clearly, these results provided support for the theoretical
predictions of the integrative model with respect to performance criteria, especially in
light of the fact that controlling for cognitive ability did not eliminate the significance
of the simple slope for RMS under a low level of self-reported AM.
The MHMR procedure was also utilized to test the integrative model with
respect to the assessment center consensus (see Table 14). In the analysis without
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controlling for cognitive ability, entry of RMS and self-reported AM on Step 1 led to a
significant increase in R2, F(2, 257) = 107.18, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by selfreported AM interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2,
F(1, 256) = 0.59, p > .10. Therefore, the additive model for RMS and self-reported
AM was supported in this analysis. In the subsequent analysis that controlled for
cognitive ability, entry of RMS, self-reported AM, and Watson-Glaser scores on Step
1 led to a significant increase in R2, F(3, 256) = 219.87, p < .01. Entry of the RMS by
self-reported AM interaction term on Step 2 did not lead to a significant increase in R2,
F(1, 255) = 1.55, p > .10. Thus, both sets of analyses for assessment center consensus
provided support for the integrative model. Indeed, in the absence of cognitive ability,
46% of the variance in the assessment center consensus performance ratings was
predicted the additive effects of both RMS (b = .40, p < .01) and self-reported AM (b
= .43, p < .01). In the presence of cognitive ability, 72% of the variance in the
assessment center consensus performance ratings was predicted by the additive effects
of the covariate, RMS (b = .09, p < .05), and self-reported AM (b = .21, p < .01).
In order to examine these additive effects, the relationship between RMS and
assessment center consensus ratings was graphed at high and low levels of selfreported AM without and with controlling for cognitive ability. The resulting graphic
representations produced from the regression analyses are presented in Figure 20.
Notice that the empirical results displayed in both the upper and lower graphs of
Figure 20 are consistent with the predictions of the integrative model made with
respect to performance. Specifically, there was no interaction in either case (without
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and with cognitive ability), and thus in both cases Congruent AMs obtained higher
assessment center consensus ratings than Congruent FFs and Hesitant AMs.
Furthermore, in these graphs Congruent AMs also appeared to outperform AM
Pretenders, but as before (i.e., as with school performance in Studies 1c and 2, and
overall in-basket performance in the current study) this difference in consensus
performance ratings between these two prototypes was reduced when controlling for
cognitive ability.
Importantly, as predicted a priori, Congruent FFs obtained lower assessment
center consensus performance ratings than all other prototypes, although the difference
between Congruent FFs and Hesitant AMs became marginal in the presence of
cognitive ability. In sum, these rank orders on the assessment center performance
ratings are consistent with the rank orders predicted by the a priori additive pattern of
the integrative model when used to explain differences in performance. Indeed, when
cognitive ability was controlled for, the additive pattern was maintained in this case.
Once again, to clarify these results, tests of the significance of the simple
slopes were pursued. The statistical significance of the simple slopes for RMS at low
and high levels of self-reported AM was determined without and with Watson-Glaser
scores as a covariate. As can be seen in Table 15, the simple slope for RMS at a low
level of self-reported AM in the prediction of assessment center performance ratings
was significant without (.43, p < .01), but became nonsignificant with Watson-Glaser
controlled. The simple slope for RMS at a high level of self-reported AM in the
prediction of assessment center performance ratings was significant (.37, p < .01), and
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remained so (.13, p < .05) in the presence of Watson-Glaser scores. Clearly, these
results provided support for the theoretical predictions of the integrative model with
respect to performance criteria, especially in light of the fact that controlling for
cognitive ability did not eliminate the significance of the simple slope for RMS under
a high level of self-reported AM.
Discussion
These results provide support for the ability of the integrative model to predict
variance in performance above and beyond cognitive ability. Once again, Congruent
AMs obtained higher performance levels than Congruent FFs and Hesitant AMs on
both criteria, and Congruent FFs obtained lower performance levels than AM
Pretenders on both criteria. Further, Congruent FFs also obtained lower performance
levels than Hesitant AMs on the in-basket task. Again, these rank orders are
consistent with the additive predictions of the integrative model when used to explain
differences in performance.
As in Study 2, here it appeared that Hesitant AMs obtained slightly lower levels of
performance than AM Pretenders, again suggesting that AM Pretenders are more
motivated than Hesitant AMs when in pursuit of rewards that are socially oriented (cf.
McClelland et al., 1989). Most importantly, this study demonstrated the
generalizability of the integrative model to the prediction of performance among
working adults in an organizational setting.
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION
At the end of McClelland’s (1985, p. 824) review he called for additional
studies on integrative models of personality: “We need more studies of this sort that
show the joint effect of motives, skills, and values or schemas as joint determinants of
what people do (i.e., their operant behaviors) as well as what they consciously say they
choose to do (i.e., their respondent behaviors).” This research has attempted to answer
that call with respect to achievement motivation and fear-of-failure.
Three studies tested the ability of the integrative model to explain individual
differences in effort and performance. In examining the change from a multiplicative
disordinal pattern of results for the prediction of effort that was found when a feasible
opportunity for withdrawal was not available, to an additive pattern of results for the
prediction of performance obtained under various conditions with various samples,
several general conclusions can be drawn regarding the utility of the integrative model
and its prototypes for explaining human behavior.
Regardless of the task and the setting studied, Congruent AMs appeared to
exert high levels of effort and obtained high levels of performance. According to the
integrative model, Congruent AMs have the tendency to approach challenging tasks,
and perhaps do so in multiple settings especially when considering the aggregate
findings for the participants of Study 1. It is assumed that the tendency to approach
challenging tasks on the part of Congruent AMs arises, in part, because the difficulties
(e.g., failures) encountered when approaching challenge do not lead to aversive
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psychological states for Congruent AMs (e.g., see Dweck & Leggett, 1988), and thus
do not lead to avoidance of challenge. Although the current studies did not test this
developmental assertion and those below directly, the correlational evidence provided
by these studies is supportive of these developmental possibilities. Thus, perhaps as a
result of continually approaching challenging tasks, Congruent AMs appear to learn to
put forth high levels of effort needed to succeed at these tasks, and thus develop the
requisite skills for high levels of performance. Therefore, not only were Congruent
AMs able to exert high levels of effort as evidenced in Study 1a, but they were also
able to combine high levels of effort with their acquired skills to reach higher levels of
performance than the other prototypes. In sum, the congruency of their implicit and
explicit motives appears to lead to their cross-situational consistency in terms of effort
and performance, perhaps due to having simply developed the habit of striving to
achieve for both the intrinsic pleasure derived from the strivings themselves and the
social rewards (e.g., recognition) that result from these strivings (see McClelland et
al., 1989). Future research should expand upon the correlational evidence provided
here for these developmental possibilities by assessing school children with
longitudinal time series designs.
Although Congruent FFs can obviously put forth levels of effort as high as
Congruent AMs, they clearly do not tend to reach the same high levels of performance.
Consequently, the assumption of the integrative model that Congruent FFs have not
acquired the requisite skills for high levels of performance in comparison to Congruent
AMs was supported by the findings. Moreover, the reason for the lack of skill
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acquisition among Congruent FFs is most likely based in their tendency to avoid the
challenging tasks that may lead to failure, and for them in particular, subsequent
feelings of inadequacy that arise from their implicit belief that skills are fixed (cf.
Dweck & Leggett, 1988). As a consequence, for Congruent FFs failure is interpreted
as revealing inherent inadequacies within the self, and thus they develop a strategy of
avoiding situations that may lead to failure or even setbacks that resemble failure,
which leads to a lack of skill acquisition. In sum, due to their avoidance of
challenging tasks, Congruent FFs do not acquire the skills that come from continually
approaching challenging tasks, and thus they do not obtain high levels of performance.

It is also important to note that although Congruent FFs have very different
self-perceptions of motivation in comparison to Congruent AMs as revealed by selfreports, Congruent FFs will put forth comparable levels of effort when the task is
made purposely evocative, and withdrawal from the task could also cause
psychological damage (see findings of Study 1a). Therefore, under pressure
Congruent FFs may exert effort in order to avoid failure, as they have a fear of failure
rather than an apathy toward failure. However, over time and in the absence of this
imposed situational pressure, they most likely withdrawal into their natural tendency to
avoid challenge, and consequently learn fewer skills and thus obtain lower levels of
performance in comparison to Congruent AMs. Again, these developmental
assertions, although supported by the correlational data presented here, were not tested
directly by the current studies and should be in future research.
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Although Hesitant AMs put forth less effort than Congruent FFs in Study 1a,
they generally obtained higher levels of performance in subsequent studies. It would
appear that Hesitant AMs have the latent motive to achieve, and yet have conscious
concerns about the stressors and sacrifices associated with achievement-strivings.
They appear to be conflicted in their approach of challenging tasks, which serves to
explain the low levels of effort in the experimental session. Indeed, in accordance
with their CRT scores, their interpretation of failure does not lead to aversive
psychological states in comparison to Congruent FFs, and thus Hesitant AMs exerted
much less effort on the cryptoquote task as they did not need to avoid failure to avoid
psychological damage. Their conflicted nature with respect to approaching challenge
also explains the lower level of performance they attained in comparison to Congruent
AMs.
To interpret the results for AM Pretenders it should be noted that social
incentives were not present in the cryptoquote task and the math test given the
experimental nature of the settings. However, for course grade and GPA, as well as
for assessment center performance, certainly social incentives for high performance
were present. Thus, under nonexperimental conditions, AM Pretenders clearly try to
reach high levels of performance, most likely because they desire the resulting socially
laden rewards that generally follow high performance. Indeed, in accordance with
their self-reports, they appear very driven to excel in comparison to Congruent FFs,
and indeed do tend to outperform Congruent FFs when socially laden rewards may
follow, but not when these rewards are absent, such as in the experimental setting (see
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Studies 1a & 1b). This speculation helps to explain the dramatic change in the
findings for AM Pretenders as the research moved from studying effort in an
experimental setting to studying performance in an academic setting, and then
performance in an organizational setting. Future research should test this speculation
more directly by varying the socially laden nature of rewards for the same group of
study participants, and perhaps by crossing these rewards with tasks of varying levels
of challenge as well.
In sum, it would appear that AM Pretenders experience conscious pressures to
achieve (as revealed in self-reports), but have a high latent fear-of-failure (as revealed
in the CRT). They are thus conflicted in their approach of challenging tasks, and the
dramatic shift from their low level of effort in the experimental setting to higher levels
of performance in the school and organizational settings suggests that they are
responding to socially-laden rewards present in the latter situations (i.e., school and
work; cf. McClelland, et al., 1989).
One weakness of the current research came in the form of the change in the
self-reports used to measure explicit achievement motives across the various studies.
This change in self-reports serves as an alternate explanation for some of the
differences in results found across the studies. However, it should be noted that in
Studies 1a, 1b, and 1c, as the criterion moved from effort to performance the pattern of
results moved from being multiplicative to one that was more additive in form while
the self-report (i.e., the semantic differential) remained the same. Additionally, when
performance indicators were utilized in Studies 2 and 3 the pattern basically remained
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additive in spite of the change in the self-reports used to measure explicit motives.
Consequently, the additive pattern found for performance indicators appears to
generalize across samples and self-reports when withdrawal on the part of the
participants is feasible. From this standpoint, the change in the self-reports across the
studies serves as a strength in that it suggests an enhanced generalizability of the
findings as they are not restricted to the self-report utilized.
It should be reiterated that the performance measures used in these studies were
tainted with effort as one must almost always put forth effort in order to perform well
(e.g., one must typically concentrate and read a test item to answer it correctly, one
must attend class lectures and tests to perform well in a course, one must show up to
work to perform well on the on-site work tasks, etc.). Consequently, the two general
predictions that were derived when considering the prototypes of the integrative model
in conjunction with the findings of past research were generally supported in this
series of studies.
Specifically, the additive prediction of effort and performance derived from the
integrative model for conditions in which withdrawal is feasible and people can
typically work at their own pace (e.g., during the semester in a course), was generally
supported. Implicit motives measured via the CRT generally combined in an additive
fashion with explicit motives measured via self-reports to predict effort and
performance, save when withdrawal was not feasible, or could lead to psychological
damage. Specifically, the multiplicative and disordinal prediction of effort derived
from the integrative model for the condition in which withdrawal is not feasible, or
99

would lead to psychological damage (e.g., lower self-esteem), was generally
supported. Implicit motives measured via the CRT interacted strongly with explicit
motives measured via self-report in the prediction of effort when withdrawal was not
feasible.
Further, the predictions of the integrative model generally held even when
controlling for cognitive ability, and thus incremental validity for the integrative model
was generally demonstrated. However, it should be mentioned that in the regression
analyses when variance in cognitive ability was partialled from variance in RMS, the
reason some of these study participants became achievement-motivated to begin with
may have been partialled out as well, and that reason being the desire to increase their
mental ability (personal communication, Anthony L. Hemmelgarn, October 6, 1997).
This speculation is consistent with the circular nonrecursive and developmental model
of achievement motivation and cognitive ability proposed by James (1998), and should
be tested more directly via a repeated measures time-series design in future research.
The results also illustrated that although implicit achievement motives, as
measured by the CRT, can be significantly related to explicit achievement motives, as
measured by self-reports, they are clearly not redundant, and the correlation between
the two is typically low and often nonsignificant. Consequently, when considered in
conjunction with the overall findings, these low correlations between RMS and selfreports of AM indicate that the CRT measures an implicit component of achievement
motivation that is distinct from the explicit achievement motives measured via self-
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reports. This finding is entirely consistent with past empirical research (James, 1998;
McClelland et al., 1989, p. 691).
As they are not totally redundant, the combination of these implicit and explicit
components of personality should lead to improved prediction of human behavior in
school and at work. In fact, when concentrating on the performance results (i.e.,
Studies 1c, 2, & 3), it seems clear that selection specialists who rely only on self-report
tests when hiring may very well (1) tend to correctly select Congruent AMs, (2)
accurately reject Congruent FFs, and yet (3) often incorrectly select AM Pretenders
while (4) occasionally incorrectly assuming a lack of employability of Hesitant AMs.
Thus, given additive incremental validity observed in these studies, an integration of
self-report with conditional reasoning methodologies for selection purposes may be
more advantageous than the application of either methodology when used in isolation.
Some of the more impressive results from the current integrative model of
personality assessment for achievement motivation and fear-of-failure certainly also
“encourage us to believe that a science of personality is indeed possible” (McClelland,
1985, p. 824), and with the introduction of the conditional reasoning methodology,
more convenient (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; James, 1998). In sum, the CRT, when
combined with self-reports, allows for opportune and affordable pursuits of integrative
models of personality, which, until recently, were not easily pursued (Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995), but certainly led to the impressive prediction of behavior, as well as to
its scientific explanation.
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Table 1
Integrative Model of the Affiliative Motive with Extraversion—Introversion and
Resulting Hypotheses (adapted from Winter et al., 1998, Table 3, p. 238)

In conjunction with
Motive
Trait

Low Affiliation

Extraversion

Respected and proficient at
interpersonal relationships, but
not dependent upon them

Unconflicted quest of various
interpersonal relationships,
comfortable in social settings

Introversion

Contented and most capable
when working alone, and not
affected by opinions of others

Warmth and companionship are
desired, but uncomfortable in
many social settings

113

High Affiliation

Table 2
Justification Mechanisms for Achievement Motivation and Fear-of-Failure (adapted from James, 1998, pp. 134 & 137)
Justification Mechanisms
Achievement Motivation

Fear-of-Failure

114

Personal Responsibility Bias – inclination to prefer personal
factors such as motivation, intensity, and persistence as the
primary causes of performance on challenging tasks

External Attribution Bias – inclination to prefer external
factors such as a deficiency of resources as the primary
causes of performance on challenging tasks

Opportunity Bias – disposition to interpret demanding tasks
on which it is possible to fail as opportunities to acquire new
skills

Liability/Threat Bias – inclination to view challenging tasks
as liabilities or risks because one may fail and be seen as
incapable

Positive Connotation of Achievement Striving – inclination
to associate effort on challenging tasks with dedication and
commitment

Negative Connotation of Achievement Striving – inclination
to view effort on challenging tasks as stressful and
potentially harmful

Malleability of Skills – inclination to assume that the skills
needed to master challenging tasks can be acquired through
practice and experience

Fixed Skills – inclination to assume that skills are static and
cannot be improved with practice and experience

Identification with Achievers – inclination to identify with
the eagerness, vigor, and striving that characterize people
who accomplish challenging tasks

Identification with Failures – inclination to identify with the
fear and apprehension of persons who fail on challenging
tasks
Indirect Compensation – inclination to associate less
challenging tasks and situations with positive or sociallydesirable qualities
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Table 3
Integrative Model of Personality Assessment for Achievement Motivation and Fear of Failure

SELF-REPORT
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AM
- I enjoy doing things which challenge me.
- I strive to achieve all I can.
- I often set goals that are very difficult to
reach.
- I have a burning desire to be a high
achiever at school.
FF
- I really don’t enjoy hard work.
- I am easy-going and lackadaisical.
- I would rather do an easy job than one
involving obstacles which must be
overcome.
- I don’t feel like I’m driven to get ahead.

CONDITIONAL REASONING
JMs for FF
JMs for AM
- External Attribution Bias
- Personal Responsibility Bias
- Liability/Threat Bias
- Opportunity Bias
- Negative Connotation of Achievement
- Positive Connotation of
Striving
Achievement Striving
- Fixed Skills
- Malleability of Skills
- Identification with Failures
- Identification with Achievers
- Indirect Compensation
AM PRETENDERS
- Perceive themselves as high achievers but
are disposed to reason based on FF JMs.
- Experience conscious pressure to approach
achievement-oriented tasks, but actually
approach those tasks on which they can
deflect responsibility for failure.
CONGRUENT FFS
- Avoid achievement-oriented tasks
- Fearful
- Nervous
- Anxious

116

CONGRUENT AMS
- Approach demanding and
achievement-oriented tasks
- Ambitious
- Aspiring
- Industrious
HESITANT AMS
- Have conscious concerns about
stress and avoiding obsessions
- Underlying enthusiasm for
plunging into achievementoriented tasks
- Approach-avoidance conflicts

Table 4
Study 1: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables
Descriptives
M
SD

Variable Name
RMS
Self-Report of AM
ACT Composite
Number of Cryptoquotes Attempted
Persistence
Intensity on 1st Cryptoquote
Total Intensity
Effort
Math Total Performance
Course Grade
Overall GPA

2.67
2.88
23.13
3.61
4.39
22.00
74.65
23.31
3.65
84.67
3.23
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117

4.79
.70
3.54
1.54
1.54
20.74
40.19
16.30
1.08
7.74
.54

Table 5
Study 1: Correlations Among Study Variables
Variable Name

126
117

1. RMS
2. Self-Report of AM
3. ACT Composite
4. Number of Cryptoquotes Attempted
5. Persistence
6. Intensity on 1st Cryptoquote
7. Total Intensity
8. Effort
9. Math Total Performance
10. Course Grade
11. Overall GPA

1
---.09
.35
-.08
.08
.13
.05
.08
.19
.27
.22

2
----.03
.17
-.17
-.09
-.04
-.15
.06
.20
.07

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

---.04
----.04 -1.00
.16 -.42
.28 -.11
.13 -.58
.38 -.11
.33 -.04
.48 -.03

---.42
.11
.58
.11
.04
.03

---.67
.81
.14
.04
.06

---.73
.08
.02
.12

---.10
-.04
-.03

---.31
.35

---.56

----

Note. N size ranged from 84 to 110 due to missing data. Correlations in italics are significant at p < .10, correlations in bold
are significant at p < .05, and correlations in bold italics are significant at p < .01. All tests were one-tailed.
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Table 6
Study 1: Effects of Latent (RMS) and Self-Reported (SR) Achievement Motivation and
Their (In)congruence on Persistence, Intensity, Effort, and School Performance with
and without Controlling for Cognitive Ability (ACT Composite) on Step 1

Dependent Variable Name
Persistence
Intensity on 1st Cryptoquote
Total Intensity
Effort
Math Total Performance
Course Grade
Overall GPA

Without ACT Composite on Step 1
Beta Weights
R-Squared Values
2
RMS SR RMS ´ SR DR Interaction Total R2
.10 -.11
.32
.10
.13
.14 -.06
.28
.08
.11
.06 -.04
.21
.04
.05
.11 -.09
.37
.13
.16
.18
.26
.21

.02
.19
.09

-------

.01
.00
.00

.04
.11
.06

With ACT Composite on Step 1
Dependent Variable Name
Persistence
Intensity on 1st Cryptoquote
Total Intensity
Effort
Math Total Performance
Course Grade
Overall GPA

Beta Weights
RMS SR RMS ´ SR
.12 -.14
.33
.10 -.07
.28
-.06 -.00
.20
.06 -.11
.37
.06
.05
--.16
.19
--.05
.08
---

R-Squared Values
2
DR Interaction Total R
.11
.15
.12
.07
.04
.12
.13
.17
.01
.14
.01
.18
.01
.25
2

Note. N size equaled 82 for analyses without ACT and 79 for analyses with ACT due
to missing data and listwise deletion. Beta weights in italics are significant at p < .10,
those in bold are significant at p < .05, and those in bold italics are significant at p <
.01. The beta weights reported for RMS, SR, and RMS ´ SR were obtained from the
final model. The final model was defined by the last step for which the R-squared
change was significant. Recall that Step 1 tested main effects and Step 2 tested the
interaction. Therefore, when the interaction term was nonsignificant the beta weights
for RMS and SR were obtained from the first step of the model. This was performed
in order to avoid loss of covariance with the dependent variable from these main
effects as a result of their multicollinearity with the nonsignificant interaction term.
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Table 7
Study 1: Significance Tests of Simple Slopes with RMS as the Predictor and SelfReport as the Moderator

Dependent Variable Name
Persistence
Intensity on 1st Cryptoquote
Total Intensity
Effort
Math Total Performance
Course Grade
Overall GPA

Self-Report at – 1 SD Self-Report at + 1 SD
Without
With
Without
With
ACT
ACT
ACT
ACT
-.20
-.13
-.13
-.24
.07
.26
.24

-.18
-.16
-.23
-.28
-.01
.21
.16

.39
.41
.25
.45
.28
.22
.19

.43
.36
.12
.40
.15
.09
-.05

Note. N size equaled 82 for analyses without ACT, and 79 for analyses with ACT.
"Without ACT" refers to the regression equations without ACT as a covariate, and
"With ACT" refers to the regression equations that include ACT as a covariate to
control for cognitive ability. Simple slopes in italics are significant at p < .10, those in
bold are significant at p < .05, and those in bold italics are significant at p < .01.
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Table 8
Study 2: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables

Variable Name
RMS
Self-Report (Achievement Striving)
ACT Composite
Course Grade
Overall GPA

Descriptives
M
SD
2.63
4.05
28.37
4.73
23.60
3.70
79.17
14.37
3.01
.57

Note. The 8-item achievement striving self-report was obtained from the NEO-PI-R.

120
129

Table 9
Study 2: Correlations Among Study Variables
Variable Name

1
---.01
.30
.09
.21

1. RMS
2. Self-Report (Achievement Striving)
3. ACT Composite
4. Course Grade
5. Overall GPA

2

3

4

5

---.02
.27
.21

---.37
.48

---.62

----

Note. N size ranged from 226 to 299 due to missing data. The 8-item achievement
striving self-report was obtained from the NEO-PI-R. Correlations in italics are
significant at p < .10, correlations in bold are significant at p < .05, and correlations in
bold italics are significant at p < .01. All tests were one-tailed.
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Table 10
Study 2: Effects of Latent (RMS) and Self-Reported (SR) Achievement Motivation and
Their (In)congruence on School Performance with and without Controlling for
Cognitive Ability (ACT Composite) on Step 1

Dependent Variable Name
Course Grade
Overall GPA

Without ACT Composite on Step 1
Beta Weights
R-Squared Values
RMS SR RMS ´ SR DR2 Interaction Total R2
.12
.31
.12
.12
.02
.21
.24
--.00
.11
With ACT Composite on Step 1

Dependent Variable Name
Course Grade
Overall GPA

Beta Weights
RMS SR RMS ´ SR
-.05
.31
.11
.07
.25
---

R-Squared Values
2
DR2 Interaction Total R
.01
.29
.00
.34

Note. N size equaled 239 for analyses without ACT and 210 for analyses with ACT
due to missing data and listwise deletion. The 8-item achievement striving self-report
was obtained from the NEO-PI-R. Beta weights in italics are significant at p < .10,
those in bold are significant at p < .05, and those in bold italics are significant at p <
.01. The beta weights reported for RMS, SR, and RMS ´ SR were obtained from the
final model. The final model was defined by the last step for which the R-squared
change was significant. Recall that Step 1 tested main effects and Step 2 tested the
interaction. Therefore, when the interaction term was nonsignificant the beta weights
for RMS and SR were obtained from the first step of the model. This was performed
in order to avoid loss of covariance with the dependent variable from these main
effects as a result of their multicollinearity with the nonsignificant interaction term.
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Table 11
Study 2: Significance Tests of Simple Slopes with RMS as the Predictor and SelfReport as the Moderator

Dependent Variable Name
Course Grade
Overall GPA

Self-Report at – 1 SD Self-Report at + 1 SD
Without
With
Without
With
ACT
ACT
ACT
ACT
-.00
.14

-.09
.05

.13
.24

.03
.08

Note. N size equaled 239 for analyses without ACT, and 210 for analyses with ACT.
"Without ACT" refers to the regression equations without ACT as a covariate, and
"With ACT" refers to the regression equations that include ACT as a covariate to
control for cognitive ability. Simple slopes in italics are significant at p < .10, those in
bold are significant at p < .05, and those in bold italics are significant at p < .01.
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Table 12
Study 3: Descriptive Statistics for Study Variables

Variable Name
RMS
Self-Report (AM via Independence)
Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking
Overall In-Basket Performance
Assessment Center Consensus

Descriptives
M
SD
2.31
4.02
54.85
6.08
59.70
8.83
2.78
.54
2.86
1.06

Note. The AM via Independence self-report was obtained from the CPI.

124
133

Table 13
Study 3: Correlations Among Study Variables
Variable Name

1
---.31
.57
.39
.54

1. RMS
2. Self-Report (AM via Independence)
3. Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking
4. Overall In-Basket Performance
5. Assessment Center Consensus

2

3

4

5

---.46
.38
.55

---.51
.82

---.69

----

Note. N size ranged from 260 to 263 due to missing data. The AM via Independence
self-report was obtained from the CPI. Correlations in italics are significant at p < .10,
correlations in bold are significant at p < .05, and correlations in bold italics are
significant at p < .01. All tests were one-tailed.
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Table 14
Study 3: Effects of Latent (RMS) and Self-Reported (SR) Achievement Motivation and
Their (In)congruence on Assessment Center Performance with and without
Controlling for Cognitive Ability (Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking) on Step 1

Dependent Variable Name
Overall In-Basket
Assessment Center

Without Watson-Glaser on Step 1
Beta Weights
R-Squared Values
2
RMS SR RMS ´ SR DR Interaction Total R2
.30
.28
-.10
.01
.24
.40
.43
--.00
.46
With Watson-Glaser on Step 1

Dependent Variable Name
Overall In-Basket
Assessment Center

Beta Weights
RMS SR RMS ´ SR
.18
--.14
.21
--.09

R-Squared Values
2
DR Interaction Total R
.00
.30
.00
.72
2

Note. N size was 260 for analyses without and with Watson-Glaser due to missing
data and listwise deletion. Beta weights in italics are significant at p < .10, those in
bold are significant at p < .05, and those in bold italics are significant at p < .01. The
beta weights reported for RMS, SR, and RMS ´ SR were obtained from the final
model. The final model was defined by the last step for which the R-squared change
was significant. Recall that Step 1 tested main effects and Step 2 tested the
interaction. Therefore, when the interaction term was nonsignificant the beta weights
for RMS and SR were obtained from the first step of the model. This was performed
in order to avoid loss of covariance with the dependent variable from these main
effects as a result of their multicollinearity with the nonsignificant interaction term.
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Table 15
Study 3: Significance Tests of Simple Slopes with RMS as the Predictor and SelfReport as the Moderator

Dependent Variable Name
Overall In-Basket Performance
Assessment Center Consensus

Self-Report at – 1 SD Self-Report at + 1 SD
Without
With
Without
With
W-G
W-G
W-G
W-G
.39
.43

.20
.04

.20
.37

.08
.13

Note. N size was 260 for analyses with and without W-G. "Without W-G" refers to
the regression equations without the Watson-Glaser as a covariate, and "With W-G"
refers to the regression equations that include the Watson-Glaser as a covariate to
control for cognitive ability. Simple slopes in italics are significant at p < .10, those in
bold are significant at p < .05, and those in bold italics are significant at p < .01.
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High

Achievement
Performance

High Achievement Value
Low Achievement Value

Low
Low

Motive to Achieve

High

Figure 1. The Basic Form of the Two-Way Interaction between Self-Reported Value of
Achievement and the Motive to Achieve in the Prediction of Achievement Performance
(adapted from McClelland, 1985, p. 816)
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1

Relationship Difficulties

Extraverts
Introverts

0

-1
-1.5

0

1.5

Affiliation Motive
Figure 2. Prediction of Relationship Difficulty from the Interaction of the
Extraversion-Introversion Trait with the Affiliative Motive (adapted from Winter et al.,
1998, p. 245)
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CRT Problem: Implied Causal Links from the Stem
Achievement
Striving

+

Increased Risk
of
Cardiovascular
Disease

CRT Problem: Implied Causal Links from the Selection of Response Alternative A
Achievement
Striving

+

Increased Risk
of
Cardiovascular
Disease

+

Aggressiveness
& Impatience

CRT Problem: Implied Causal Links from the Selection of Response Alternative D
Achievement
Striving

+

Increased Risk
of
Cardiovascular
Disease

+

Other
Unspecified
Causes

Figure 3. Conceptualization of the Example CRT Problem in Terms of Causal
Attributions and the Changes to those Causal Attributions that Are Implied by the
Different AM and FF Response Alternatives to the Problem
Note. The “+” symbol above a solid, large arrow symbolizes a positive causal link
between preceding and subsequent variables, where increases in the former lead to
increases in the latter. The “ ” symbol over the “+” symbol above a dashed, large
arrow symbolizes a negation of the positive causal link between preceding and
subsequent variables, where increases in the former have a negligible effect on
changes in the latter. The “+” symbol above a solid, small arrow symbolizes a
weakening of the positive causal link between preceding and subsequent variables,
where increases in the former typically lead to increases in the latter, but the latter may
also have other unspecified causes.
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Person 3 (Task 2)

Intensity
Person 2 (Task 1)

Person 1 (Task 1)

Time
Figure 4. Conceptualization of Effort as a Function of Task Choice, Intensity, and
Persistence
Note. In the above figure effort is conceptualized as a function of intensity (i.e., how
hard one is working), time (i.e., whether or not one persists until successful), and task
choice (i.e., devotion of effort to one task instead of another). Thus, for example, in
the figure Person 1 can be seen as putting forth less effort on Task 1 than Person 2.
Furthermore, Person 1 stops working on Task 1 before Person 2, and thus is less
persistent than Person 2. However, Person 3 is working harder than both Person 1 and
Person 2, but on a different task (i.e., Task 2).
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Congruent
AMs
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Performance
& Effort

Low

Hesitant
AMs
AM
Pretenders
Congruent
FFs

High AM Self-Report
Low AM Self-Report

High
Congruent
FFs

Congruent
AMs

AM
Pretenders

Hesitant
AMs

Effort

Low
Low

RMS

High

Figure 5. The Basic Form of the Additive Prediction of Performance and Effort by the
CRT and Self-Reported Achievement Motivation When Withdrawal Is Feasible
(Above), and the Interactive Prediction Made for Effort When Withdrawal Is Not
Feasible (Below
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Figure 6. Study 1a: Persistence on Cryptoquote Task
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. Moderated hierarchical multiple regression (MHMR) was used for
statistical tests of the integrative model. Consequently, the CA, CF, HA, and AP
labels in the figures displaying simple slopes are provided for convenience of
interpretation. All plots of interactions are based on unstandardized regression
weights. Persistence equals 8 minus the number of cryptoquote problems attempted.
The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive ability, and the
lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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1

Intensity on 1st Cryptoquote

Self-Report AM
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Intensity on 1st Cryptoquote

1
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AP
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Figure 7. Study 1a: Intensity on 1st Cryptoquote
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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Figure 8. Study 1a: Total Intensity on Cryptoquote Task
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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Figure 9. Study 1a: Effort on Cryptoquote Task
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. Effort equaled total intensity divided by the number of cryptoquotes
attempted. Thus, the average level of intensity of effort expended per cryptoquote
puzzle attempted created the "effort" criterion. The upper graph displays the results
without controlling for cognitive ability, and the lower graph displays the results when
controlling for cognitive ability.
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Percent of Participants Reaching the Puzzle

1.2

CF

1

AP
0.8

HA
CA
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Cryptoquote Puzzle Number

Figure 10. Study 1a: The Four Integrative Model Prototypes and Persistence on the
Cryptoquote Puzzles
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The integrative model prototypes were created via median splits on RMS
and self-reported AM. Specifically, participants who scored above the median on both
measures were labeled as Congruent AMs, those who scored below the median on
both measures were labeled as Congruent FFs, those who scored above the median on
RMS and below the median on the self-report were labeled Hesitant AMs, and those
who scored below the median on RMS and above the median on the self-report were
labeled as AM Pretenders.
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Figure 11. Study 1a: The Four Integrative Model Prototypes and Intensity on the
Cryptoquote Puzzles
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders.The integrative model prototypes in Figure 11 were created via the same
mean splits on RMS and self-reported AM that were described in Figure 10. Recall
that the full sample is available for analysis only for the first cryptoquote problem as
some CAs persisted in their efforts to solve the first problem, and thus did not proceed
to subsequent problems. Thus, in this figure the very persistent CAs, who worked at a
high level of intensity on the first cryptoquote problem, do not contribute to mean
level of intensity calculated on the second cryptoquote problem, nor on subsequent
problems.
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Figure 12. Study 1a: Mean Level of Effort on the Cryptoquote Task for the Four
Integrative Model Prototypes
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The integrative model prototypes in Figure 12 were created via the same
mean splits on RMS and self-reported AM that were described in Figure 10.
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Figure 13. Study 1b: The Prediction of Math Total Performance via the Integrative
Model
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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Percent Answering Problem Correctly
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Figure 14. Study 1b: The Four Integrative Model Prototypes and Performance on
Math Problems of Increasing Difficulty Level
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The integrative model prototypes in Figure 14 were created via the same
mean splits on RMS and self-reported AM that were described in Figure 10.
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Figure 15. Study 1c: The Prediction of Course Grade via the Integrative Model
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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Figure 16. Study 1c: The Prediction of Overall GPA via the Integrative Model
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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Figure 17. Study 2: The Prediction of Course Grade via the Integrative Model
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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Figure 18. Study 2: The Prediction of Overall GPA via the Integrative Model
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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Figure 19. Study 3: The Prediction of Overall In-Basket Performance via the
Integrative Model
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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Figure 20. Study 3: The Prediction of Assessment Center Consensus via the
Integrative Model
Note. CA = Congruent AMs, CF = Congruent FFs, HA = Hesitant AMs, and AP = AM
Pretenders. The upper graph displays the results without controlling for cognitive
ability, and the lower graph displays the results when controlling for cognitive ability.
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APPENDIX C
CRYPTOQUOTE TASK
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Cryptoquote Instructions
This is a test of verbal and problem solving abilities which uses cryptoquotes. A
cryptoquote is a name, phrase, or sentence which has been encoded. The code is
created by substituting each letter of the alphabet with a different letter of the alphabet.
The cryptogram is solved by cracking the code to uncover the phrase or sentence
hidden within it. In order to clarify what a cryptoquote actually is, consider the
following example.
The phrase, “Solving mental puzzles reveals mental abilities,” can be transformed into
the cryptoquote, “Tpmwjoh nfoubm qvaamft sfwfbmt nfoubm bcjmjujft,” with the
following code:
A=B, B=C, C=D, D=E, E=F, F=G, G=H, H=I, I=J….Z=A
Notice that in some cases once part of the code is solved the phrase may become
identifiable. For instance, if in the above example you found that “u,” “o,” “f,” “m,”
“t,” “p,” “a,” “n,” “q,” “j,” and “b” represented the letters “t,” “n,” “e,” “l,” “s,” “o,”
“z,” “m,” “p,” “i” and “a,” respectively, then the phrase would look like:
Solwinh mental pvzzles seweals mental acilities.
and a guess could be offered for the solution to the cryptoquote without additional
work on the code.
There is only one rule used for the creation of a cryptoquote code, which is as follows:
A code letter can stand for only one other letter of the normal alphabet. Therefore, in
the above example, the letter “d” could not be used to substitute for both “a” and “p.”
Aside from this rule any letter may be used as a substitute for any other letter in the
creation of the cryptoquote code.
Here is another example:
I

k t a o

p l l

h t b

p f g

e f p k c

_

_ _ _ _

_ _ _

_ _ _

_ _ _

_ _ _ _ _

As the letters are correctly deciphered the phrase becomes apparent.
A

k h i o

p f f

t h b

p l g

e l p k c

A

c h i o

p f f

t h e

p l g

b l p c k

A

c h i p

o f f

t h e

o l d

b l o c k

Here is the code used for the above example.
A=I, I=A, C=K, K=C, H=T, T=H, P=O, O=P, F=L, L=F, E=B, B=E,
D=G
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Cryptoquote Instructions
You will now do several practice cryptoquotes. You will have seven minutes to solve
them. Please note that each cryptoquote has its own page. Prior to working on a
cryptoquote please check the box in the upper right hand portion of the page on which
the cryptoquote is located. Please solve the cryptoquotes in order, without skipping
one. If you have difficulty cracking the code to a cryptoquote then you may cease
working on that cryptoquote and go on to the next one. Once you have turned the page
to work on the next cryptoquote please do not return to ones that you have already
passed. You can only go forward to work on additional cryptoquotes, and only in the
order that they are presented. Beneath each cryptoquote are several blanks with which
you can test out various solutions. Feel free to use these blanks, as well as the rest of
the page, for scratch paper.
Here are a few hints to help you solve the cryptoquotes: (1) The word, “the,” is the
most common three-letter word in the English language. Therefore, take a look at
some of the three-letter codes in the cryptoquote to see if they actually represent the
word “the.” (2) The five vowels, A, E, I, O, and U comprise 40% of the letters used in
the English language. (3) The letters L, N, R, S, and T comprise 30% of the letters
used in the English language. (4) The letter E appears more frequently than any other
letter.
Please Wait For The Instructor’s Signal To Begin

Student Identification Number __________________________________________

151
160

Cryptoquote Practice Task

U f o o f t t f

f

W p m v o u f f s t

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s

_ _ _ _ _ s s _ _

V _

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ s
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Cryptoquote Practice Task

If you reach this page then please place a check mark in the above box.

STOP

You have finished the practice session.
Please wait for further instructions.
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Cryptoquote Test Instructions
Attached to this page are seven test cryptoquotes. You will have fifteen minutes to
solve them. Please note that each cryptoquote has its own page. Prior to working on a
cryptoquote please check the box in the upper right hand portion of the page on which
the cryptoquote is located. Please solve the cryptoquotes in order, without skipping
one. Once you have turned the page to work on the next cryptoquote please do not
return to ones that you have already passed. You can only go forward to work on
additional cryptoquotes, and only in the order in which they are presented. Beneath
each cryptoquote are several blanks with which you can test out various solutions.
Feel free to use these blanks, as well as the rest of the page, for scratch paper.

Please Wait For The Instructor’s Signal To Begin
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Cryptoquote Test

N b e u

i b e g n

x i l

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

_ _ _ _

k j m i p

l i x x .

_ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ .

_ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _

y

s a o

l

_ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ .
_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ .
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